Internet DRAFT - draft-yasskin-dispatch-web-packaging
draft-yasskin-dispatch-web-packaging
Dispatch J. Yasskin
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Standards Track June 30, 2017
Expires: January 1, 2018
Web Packaging
draft-yasskin-dispatch-web-packaging-00
Abstract
Web Packages provide a way to bundle up groups of web resources to
transmit them together. These bundles can then be signed to
establish their authenticity.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.1. Offline Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2. Snapshot packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.3. CDNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.4. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Why not ZIP? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. The Need for Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Mode of specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Top-level structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. From the end . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2. From the beginning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Parsing the index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Parsing the manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.1. Sub-packages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5. Parsing a resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Guidelines for package authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Internet Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
People would like to use content offline and in other situations
where there isn't a direct connection to the server where the content
originates. However, it's difficult to distribute and verify the
authenticity of applications and content without a connection to the
network. The W3C has addressed running applications offline with
Service Workers ([ServiceWorkers]), but not the problem of
distribution.
We've started work on this problem in <https://github.com/WICG/
webpackage>, but we suspect that the IETF may be the right place to
standardize the overall format. More details can be found in that
repository.
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1.1. Use Cases
1.1.1. Offline Installation
People with expensive or intermittent internet connections are used
to sharing files via P2P links and shared SD cards. They should be
able to install web applications they received this way. Installing
a web application requires a TLS-type guarantee that it came from and
can use data owned by a particular origin.
1.1.2. Snapshot packages
Verification of the origin of the content isn't always necessary.
For example, users currently share screenshots and MHTML documents
with their peers, with no guarantee that the shared content is
authentic. However, these formats have low fidelity (screenshots)
and/or aren't interoperable (MHTML). We'd like an interoperable
format that lets both publishers and readers package such content for
use in an untrusted mode.
1.1.3. CDNs
CDNs want to re-publish other origins' content so readers can access
it more quickly or more privately. Currently, to attribute that
content to the original origin, they need the full ability to publish
arbitrary content under that origin's name. There should be a way to
let them attribute only the exact content that the original origin
published.
1.1.4. ...
1.2. Why not ZIP?
WICG/webpackage#45 [1]
1.3. The Need for Standardization
Publishers and readers should be able to generate a package once, and
have it usable by all browsers.
1.4. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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2. Format
2.1. Mode of specification
This specification defines how conformant web package parsers convert
a sequence of bytes into the semantics of a web package. It does not
constrain how web package encoders produce such a package: although
there are some guidelines in Section 3, encoders MAY produce any
sequence of bytes that a conformant parser would parse into the
intended semantics.
In places, this specification says the parser "MAY return" some data.
This indicates that the described data is complete enough that later
parsing failures do not need to discard it.
In places, this specification says the parser "MUST fail". The
parser MAY report these failures to its caller in any way, but MUST
NOT return any data it has parsed so far that wasn't mentioned in a
"MAY return" statement.
This specification creates local variables with the phrase "Let
_variable-name_ be ...". Use of a variable before it's created is a
defect in this specification.
2.2. Top-level structure
The package is roughly a CBOR item with the following CDDL schema,
but package parsers are required to successfully parse some byte
strings that aren't valid CBOR. For example, sections may have
padding between them, or even overlap, as long as the embedded
relative offsets cause the parsing algorithm in this specification to
return data.
webpackage = [
magic1: h'F0 9F 8C 90 F0 9F 93 A6', ; 🌐📦 in UTF-8.
section-offsets: { * (($section-name .within tstr) => uint) },
sections: [ *$section ],
length: uint, ; Total number of bytes in the package.
magic2: h'F0 9F 8C 90 F0 9F 93 A6', ; 🌐📦 in UTF-8.
]
The parser MAY begin parsing at either the beginning (Section 2.2.2)
or end (Section 2.2.1) of the byte string representing the package.
Parsing from the end is useful when the package is embedded in
another format such as a self-extracting executable, while parsing
from the beginning is useful when loading from a stream.
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2.2.1. From the end
To parse from the end, the parser MUST load the last 18 bytes as the
following [CDDL] group in array context: [ednote-loading-cddl]
tail = (
length: uint, ; Total number of bytes in the package.
magic2: h'F0 9F 8C 90 F0 9F 93 A6', ; 🌐📦 in UTF-8.
)
If the bytes don't match this group or these two CBOR items don't
occupy exactly 18 bytes, parsing MUST fail.
Otherwise, continue as if the byte "length" bytes before the end of
the string were the beginning of the package, and the parser were a
from the beginning (Section 2.2.2) parser.
2.2.2. From the beginning
If the first 10 bytes of the package are not "85 48 F0 9F 8C 90 F0 9F
93 A6" (the CBOR encoding of the 5-item array header and 8-byte
bytestring header, followed by 🌐📦 in UTF-8), parsing
MUST fail.
Parse one CBOR item starting at the 11th byte of the package. If
this does not match the CDDL
section-offsets = { * tstr => uint },
or it is not a Canonical CBOR item (Section 3.9 of [CBOR]), parsing
MUST fail.
Let _sections-start_ be the offset of the byte after the "section-
offsets" item. For example, if "section-offsets" were 52 bytes long,
_sections-start_ would be 63.
This specification defines two section names: "indexed-content" and
"manifest".
If "section-offsets"["indexed-content"] is not present, parsing MUST
fail.
The parser MUST ignore unknown keys in the "section-offsets" map
because new sections may be defined in future specifications.
[ednote-critical-sections]
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Let _index_ be the result of parsing the bytes starting at offset
_sections-start_ + "section-offsets"["indexed-content"] using the
instructions in Section 2.3.
If "section-offsets"["manifest"] is present, let _manifest_ be the
result of parsing the bytes starting at offset _sections-start_ +
"section-offsets"["manifest"] using the instructions in Section 2.4.
The parser MAY return a semantic package consisting of _index_, and,
if initialized, _manifest_.
To parse each resource described within _index_, the parser MUST
follow the instructions in Section 2.5.
2.3. Parsing the index
The main content of a package is an index of HTTP requests pointing
to HTTP responses. These request/response pairs hold the manifests
of sub-packages and the resources in the package and all of its sub-
packages. Both the requests and responses can appear in any order,
usually chosen to optimize loading while the package is streamed.
To parse the index, starting at offset _index-start_, the parser MUST
do the following:
If the byte at _index-start_ is not 0x82 (the [CBOR] header for a
2-element array), the parser MUST fail.
Load a CBOR item starting at _index-start_ + 1 as the "index" array
in the following CDDL:
$section-name /= "indexed-content"
$section /= index
index = [* [resource-key: http-headers,
offset: uint,
? length: uint] ]
; http-headers is a byte string in HPACK format (RFC7541).
; The dynamic table begins empty for each instance of
; http-headers.
http-headers = bstr
If the item doesn't match this CDDL, or it is not a Canonical CBOR
item (Section 3.9 of [CBOR]), the parser MUST fail.
Let _resources-start_ be the offset immediately after the "index"
item. For example, if _index-start_ were 75 and the "index" item
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were 105 bytes long, _resources-start_ would be 75+1+105=181. (1 for
the 0x82 array header.)
Decode all of the "resource-key"s using [HPACK], with an initially-
empty dynamic table for each one. [ednote-compression] The decoded
"resource-key"s are header lists ([HPACK], Section 1.3), ordered
lists of name-value pairs.
The parser MUST fail if any of the following is true:
1. HPACK decoding encountered an error.
2. Any "resource-key"'s first three headers are not named ":scheme",
":authority", and ":path", in that order. Note that ":method" is
intentionally omitted because only the GET method is meaningful.
3. Any of the pseudo-headers' values violates a requirement in
Section 8.1.2.3 of [HTTP2].
4. Any "resource-key" has a non-pseudo-header name that includes the
":" character or is not lower-case ascii ([HTTP2],
Section 8.1.2).
5. Any two decoded "resource-key"s are the same. Note that header
lists with the same header fields in a different order are not
the same.
Increment all "offset"s by _resources-start_.
Return the resulting "index", an array of decoded-resource-key,
adjusted-offset, and optional-length triples.
The optional "length" field in the index entries is redundant with
the length prefixes on the "response-headers" and "body" in the
content, but it can be used to issue Range requests [RFC7233] for
responses that appear late in the content.
2.4. Parsing the manifest
A package's manifest contains some metadata for the package; hashes,
used in Section 2.5, Paragraph 9, for all resources included in that
package; and validity information for any sub-packages
(Section 2.4.1) the package depends on. The manifest is signed, so
that UAs can trust that it comes from its claimed origin. [ednote-
manifest-name]
To parse a manifest starting at _manifest-start_, a parser MUST do
the following:
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Load one CBOR item starting at _manifest-start_ as a "signed-
manifest" from the following CDDL:
$section-name /= "manifest"
$section /= signed-manifest
signed-manifest = {
manifest: manifest,
certificates: [+ certificate],
signatures: [+ signature]
}
manifest = {
metadata: manifest-metadata,
resource-hashes: {* hash-algorithm => [hash-value]},
? subpackages: [* subpackage],
}
manifest-metadata = {
date: time,
origin: uri,
* tstr => any,
}
; From https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#grammardef-hash-algorithm.
hash-algorithm /= "sha256" / "sha384" / "sha512"
; Note that a hash value is not base64-encoded, unlike in CSP.
hash-value = bstr
; X.509 format; see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280
certificate = bstr
signature = {
; This is the index of the certificate within the certificates array to use
; to validate the signature.
keyIndex: uint,
signature: bstr,
}
If the item doesn't match the CDDL or it's not a Canonical CBOR item
(Section 3.9 of [CBOR]), parsing MUST fail.
Parse the elements of "certificates" as X.509 certificates within the
[RFC5280] profile. If any certificate fails to parse, parsing MUST
fail.
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Let _message_ be the concatenation of the following byte strings.
This matches the [TLS1.3] format to avoid cross-protocol attacks when
TLS certificates are used to sign manifests.
1. A string that consists of octet 32 (0x20) repeated 64 times.
2. A context string: the ASCII encoding of "Web Package Manifest".
3. A single 0 byte which serves as a separator.
4. The bytes of the "manifest" CBOR item.
Let _signing-certificates_ be an empty array.
For each element _signature_ of "signatures":
1. Let _certificate_ be "certificates"[_signature_["keyIndex"]].
2. The parser MUST define a partial function from public key types
to signing algorithms, with the following map as a subset:
RSA, 2048 bits: rsa_pss_sha256 as defined in Section 4.2.3 of
[TLS1.3]
EC, with the secp256r1 curve: ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 as defined
in Section 4.2.3 of [TLS1.3]
EC, with the secp384r1 curve: ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 as defined
in Section 4.2.3 of [TLS1.3]
Let _signing-alg_ be the result of applying this function to the
key type in _certificate_'s Subject Public Key Info. If the
function is undefined on this input, the parser MUST continue to
the next _signature_.
3. Use _signing-alg_ to verify that _signature_["signature"] is
_message_'s signature by _certificate_'s public key. If it's
not, the parser MUST continue to the next _signature_.
4. Append _certificate_ to _signing-certificates_. Note that failed
signatures simply cause their certificate to be ignored, so that
packagers can give new signature types to parsers that understand
them.
Let _origin_ be "manifest"["metadata"]["origin"].
Try to find a certificate in _signing-certificates_ that has an
identity ([RFC2818], Section 3.1) matching _origin_'s hostname, and
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that is trusted for serverAuth ([RFC5280], Section 4.2.1.12) using
paths built from elements of "certificates" or any other certificates
the parser is aware of. If no such certificate is found, and the
package is not already trusted as received from _origin_'s hostname,
for example because it was received over a TLS connection to that
host, then parsing MUST fail.
*TODO:* Process the "subpackages" item by fetching those manifests
via the index, and checking their signatures and dates/hashes,
recursively.
The parsed manifest consists of the set of _signing-certificates_ and
the "manifest" CBOR item. The items in "manifest"["metadata"] SHOULD
be interpreted as described in the [appmanifest] specification.
2.4.1. Sub-packages
A sub-package is represented by a Section 2.4 file looked up as a
Section 2.5 within the "indexed-content" section. The sub-package's
resources are not otherwise distinguished from the rest of the
resources in the package. Sub-packages can form an arbitrarily-deep
tree.
There are three possible forms of dependencies on sub-packages, of
which we allow two. Because a sub-package's manifest is protected by
its own signature, if the main package trusts the sub-package's
server, it could avoid specifying a version of the sub-package at
all. However, this opens the main package up to downgrade attacks,
where the sub-package is replaced by an older, vulnerable version, so
we don't allow this option.
subpackage = [
resource: resource-key,
validation: {
? hash: {+ hash-algorithm => hash-value},
? notbefore: time,
}
]
If the main package wants to load either the sub-package it was built
with or any upgrade, it can specify the date of the original sub-
package:
[32("https://example.com/loginsdk.package"), {"notbefore": 1(1486429554)}]
Constraining packages with their date makes it possible to link
together sub-packages with common dependencies, even if the sub-
packages were built at different times.
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If the main package wants to be certain it's loading the exact
version of a sub-package that it was built with, it can constrain
sub-package with a hash of its manifest:
[32("https://example.com/loginsdk.package"),
{"hash": {"sha256": b64'9qg0NGDuhsjeGwrcbaxMKZAvfzAHJ2d8L7NkDzXhgHk='}}]
Note that because the sub-package may include sub-sub-packages by
date, the top package may need to explicitly list those sub-sub-
packages' hashes in order to be completely constrained.
2.5. Parsing a resource
To parse the resource from a _package_ corresponding to a _header-
list_, a parser MUST do the following:
Find the (_resource-key_, _offset_, _length_) triple in _package_'s
index where _resource-key_ is the same as _header-list_. If no such
triple exists, the parser MUST fail.
Parse one CBOR item starting at _offset_ as the following CDDL:
response = [response-headers: http-headers, body: bstr]
If the item doesn't match the CDDL or it's not a Canonical CBOR item
(Section 3.9 of [CBOR]), parsing MUST fail.
Decode the "response-headers" field using [HPACK], with an initially-
empty dynamic table. The decoded "response-headers" is a header list
([HPACK], Section 1.3), an ordered list of name-value pairs.
The parser MUST fail if any of the following is true:
1. HPACK decoding encountered an error.
2. The first header name within "response-headers" is not ":status",
or this pseudo-header's value violates a requirement in
Section 8.1.2.3 of [HTTP2].
3. Any other header name includes the ":" character or is not lower-
case ascii ([HTTP2], Section 8.1.2).
4. The _header-list_ contains any header names other than ":scheme",
":authority", ":path", and either "response-headers" has no
"vary" header (Section 7.1.4 of [RFC7231]) or these header names
aren't listed in it.
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Let _origin_ be the Web Origin [RFC6454] of _header-list_'s ":scheme"
and ":authority" headers.
Let _resource-bytes_ be the result of encoding the array of [_header-
list_, "response-headers", "body"] as Canonical CBOR in the following
CDDL schema: [ednote-figure-in-list]
resource-bytes = [
request: [
*(header-name: bstr, header-value: bstr)
],
response-headers: [
*(header-name: bstr, header-value: bstr)
],
response-body: bstr
]
Note that this uses the decoded header fields, not the bytes
originally included in the package.
The hashed data differs from [SRI], which only hashes the body.
Including the headers will usually prevent a package from relying on
some of its contents being transferred as normal network responses,
unless its author can guarantee the network won't change or reorder
the headers.
If the _package_ contains a _manifest_:
1. *TODO:* Let _origin-manifest_ be the signed manifest for
_origin_, found by searching through _manifest_'s subpackages for
a matching origin.
2. Let _alg_ be one of the "hash-algorithm"s within _origin-
manifest_. The parser SHOULD select the most collision-resistant
hash algorithm. If the parser also implements [SRI], it SHOULD
use the same order as its "getPrioritizedHashFunction()"
implementation.
3. If the digest of _resource-bytes_ using _alg_ does not appear in
the _origin-manifest_'s "resource-hashes"[_alg_] array, the
parser MUST fail.
Return the (decoded "response-headers", "body") pair.
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3. Guidelines for package authors
Packages SHOULD consist of a single Canonical CBOR item matching the
"webpackage" CDDL rule in Section 2.2.
Every resource's hash SHOULD appear in every array within "resource-
hashes": otherwise the set of valid resources will depend on the
parser's choice of preferred hash algorithm.
4. Security Considerations
Signature validation is difficult.
Packages with a valid signature need to be invalidated when either
o the private key for any certificate in the signature's validation
chain is leaked, or
o a vulnerability is discovered in the package's contents.
Because packages are intended to be used offline, it's impossible to
inject a revocation check into the critical path of using the
package, and even in online scenarios, such revocation checks don't
actually work [2]. Instead, package consumers must check for a
sufficiently recent set of validation files, consisting of OCSP
responses [RFC6960] and signed package version constraints, for
example within the last 7-30 days. *TODO:* These version constraints
aren't designed yet.
Relaxing the requirement to consult DNS when determining authority
for an origin means that an attacker who possesses a valid
certificate no longer needs to be on-path to redirect traffic to
them; instead of modifying DNS, they need only convince the user to
visit another Web site, in order to serve packages signed as the
target.
All subpackages that mention a particular origin need to be validated
before loading resources from that origin. Otherwise, package A
could include package B and an old, vulnerable version of package C
that B also depends on. If B's dependency isn't checked before
loading resources from C, A could compromise B.
5. IANA considerations
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5.1. Internet Media Type Registration
IANA maintains the registry of Internet Media Types [RFC6838] at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types.
o Type name: application
o Subtype name: package+cbor [ednote-mime-naming]
o Required parameters: N/A
o Optional parameters: N/A
o Encoding considerations: binary
o Security considerations: See Section 4 of this document.
o Interoperability considerations: N/A
o Published specification: This document
o Applications that use this media type: None yet, but it is
expected that web browsers will use this format.
o Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
o Additional information:
* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A
* Magic number(s): 85 48 F0 9F 8C 90 F0 9F 93 A6
* File extension(s): .wpk
* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
o Person & email address to contact for further information: See the
Author's Address section of this specification.
o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: N/A
o Author: See the Author's Address section of this specification.
o Change controller: The IESG iesg@ietf.org [4]
o Provisional registration? (standards tree only): Not yet.
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[appmanifest]
Caceres, M., Christiansen, K., Lamouri, M., and A.
Kostiainen, "Web App Manifest", World Wide Web Consortium
WD WD-appmanifest-20170608, June 2017,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/WD-appmanifest-20170608>.
[CBOR] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7049>.
[CDDL] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "CBOR data
definition language (CDDL): a notational convention to
express CBOR data structures", draft-greevenbosch-appsawg-
cbor-cddl-10 (work in progress), March 2017.
[HPACK] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for
HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.
[HTML] WHATWG, "HTML", n.d., <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/
multipage/>.
[HTTP2] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
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[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SRI] Akhawe, D., Braun, F., Marier, F., and J. Weinberger,
"Subresource Integrity", World Wide Web Consortium
Recommendation REC-SRI-20160623, June 2016,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2016/REC-SRI-20160623>.
[TLS1.3] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 (work in progress),
April 2017.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7233] Fielding, R., Ed., Lafon, Y., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed.,
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Range Requests",
RFC 7233, DOI 10.17487/RFC7233, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7233>.
[ServiceWorkers]
Russell, A., Song, J., Archibald, J., and M.
Kruisselbrink, "Service Workers 1", World Wide Web
Consortium WD WD-service-workers-1-20161011, October 2016,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2016/WD-service-workers-
1-20161011>.
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6.3. URIs
[1] https://github.com/WICG/webpackage/issues/45
[2] https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/02/05/crlsets.html
[4] mailto:iesg@ietf.org
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Adam Langley and Ryan Sleevi for in-depth feedback about
the security impact of this proposal.
Editorial Comments
[ednote-loading-cddl] jyasskin: CDDL doesn't actually define how to use
it as a schema to load CBOR data.
[ednote-critical-sections] jyasskin: Do we need to mark critical section
names?
[ednote-compression] jyasskin: This spec has different security
constraints from the ones that drove HPACK, so we
may be able to do better with another compression
format.
[ednote-manifest-name] jyasskin: This section doesn't describe a
manifest (https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/manifest#h3), so consider
renaming it to something like "authenticity".
[ednote-figure-in-list] jyasskin: This step would be inside the
manifest-only block, but then the code block is
rendered out-of-order.
[ednote-mime-naming] jyasskin: I suspect the mime type will need to be a
bit longer: application/webpackage+cbor or similar.
Author's Address
Jeffrey Yasskin
Google
Email: jyasskin@chromium.org
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