Internet DRAFT - draft-ymbk-lta-use-cases
draft-ymbk-lta-use-cases
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Informational September 24, 2013
Expires: March 28, 2014
RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases
draft-ymbk-lta-use-cases-00
Abstract
There are a number of critical circumstances where a localized
routing domain needs to augment or modify the Global RPKI. This
document attempts to outline a few of them.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 28, 2014.
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This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. What is 'Local' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Example Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
Today RPKI-based Origin Validation, [RFC6811], relies on widespread
deployment of the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI),
[RFC6480]. In the future, RPKI-based Path Validation,
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview], will be even more reliant on the
Global RPKI.
But there are critical circumstances in which a local, well-scoped,
administrative and/or routing domain will need to augment and/or
modify their internal view of the Global RPKI.
This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases. It is
not intended to be autoritative, complete, or to become a standard.
It merely tries to lay out a few critical examples to help scope the
issues.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480],
the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], and Ghostbusters Records, see
[RFC6493].
3. What is 'Local'
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
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Like the DNS, the Global RPKI presents a single global view, although
only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing, updating,
fetching, etc. There is no 'fix' for this, it is not broken, it is
the nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/
or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content
provider, a geo-political region, ... may wish to have a special view
of the RPKI.
For the purposes of this exploration, we refer to this localized view
as a 'Local Trust Anchor', mostly for historical reasons, but also
because implementation would likely be the local distribution of one
or more specialized trust andchors, [RFC6481].
4. Example Uses
Carol, a RIPE member, is a victim of the "Dutch Court Attack"
(someone convinces a Dutch court to force the RIPE/NCC to remove or
modify records) and we all want to save the ability to route to
Carol's network(s). There is need for some channel through which we
can exchange some local trust command and data gorp necessary to
create patches local to all our caches.
Bob has a multi-AS network under his administration and some of those
ASs use private ([RFC1918]) or 'borrowed' US military space, and he
wishes to certify them for use in his internal routing.
Alice runs the root trust for a large organization where upper
management has the router geeks pointing their competitors' prefixes
to pictures of kittens and unicorns, and Alice is responsible for
making the CA hierarchy have validated certificates for those
redirected resources and the rest of the internet.
5. Notes
In these examples, it is ultimately the ROAs, not the certificates,
which one wants to modify. But one can't just hack new ROAs as one
does not have the private keys needed to sign them. Hence one has to
first hack the 3779 certificates.
But we should not lose sight of the goal that it is the ROAs and
Ghostbuster Records which need re-issuing under the new 3779
certificates.
Further, since we're not the NSA, GCHQ, ..., we can not assume that
we can reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or from
the RIRs' certificates. So we have to create a new trust anchor
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which, for ease of use, will contain the new/hacked certificates and
ROAs as well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI.
And, because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive,
reproduce, and send to friends the data necessary to recreate their
hacks, there will need to be a formally defind set of data which is
input to a well-defind process to take an existing Global RPKI tree
and produce the desired modified re-anchored tree.
6. Security Considerations
These use cases are all about violating global security, albeit
within a constrained local context.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
8. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Rob Austein.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
2013.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
draft-lepinski-bgpsec-overview-00 (work in progress),
March 2011.
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[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
Author's Address
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Email: randy@psg.com
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