Internet DRAFT - draft-ymbk-rpki-rov-timing
draft-ymbk-rpki-rov-timing
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
Intended status: Informational J. Snijders
Expires: October 23, 2020 NTT
April 21, 2020
Timing Parameters in the RPKI based Route Origin Validation Supply Chain
draft-ymbk-rpki-rov-timing-00
Abstract
This document explores, and makes recommendations for, timing of
Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication, propagation, and use
of RPKI ROV data in relying parties and routers.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 23, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Certification Authority Publishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Replying Party Fetching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Router Updating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Alternative Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
As Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) based Route Origin
Validation (ROV) becomes deployed in the Internet, the quality of the
routing control plane, and hence timely and accurate delivery of
packets in the data plane, depend more and more on prompt and
accurate propagation of the RPKI data from the originating
Certification Authorities (CAs), to Relying Parties (RPs), to
External Border Gateway Protocol (eBGP) speaking routers.
Origination Validation based on stale ROAs allows accidental mis-
origination. While delayed ROA propagation to ROV in routers can
cause loss of good traffic. Though it may not be reasonable today,
services such as DDoS cleaners would prefer that ROA publication had
almost immediate effect on routing.
This draft is an exploration of, and recommendations for, timing of
Resource Public Key Infrastructure publication, propagation, and use
in relying party caches and routers.
There are the questions of how frequently a CA publishes, how often
an RP pulls, and how often routers pull from their RP(s). Overall,
the router(s) SHOULD react within an hour of to ROA publication.
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For CAs publishing, a few seconds to a minute seems easily achieved
with reasonable software. See Section 4.
Relying Party validating caches periodically retrieve data from CA
publication points.. RPs using rcynic to poll publication points
every ten minutes would be a burden today, given the load it will put
on publication services, and one notorious repository which is
against specification. But RPs using RRDP impose no such load. So
as the infrastructure moves from rcynic to RRDP, fetching every ten
minutes would be reasonable. For rcynic, an hour would be the
longest acceptable window. See Section 5.
For the BGP speaking router(s) pulling from the RP(s), five minutes
to an hour is a wide window. But, the RPKI-Rtr protocol does have
the Serial Notify PDU, the equivalent of DNS Notify, where the cache
tells the router that it has new data. See Section 6.
We discuss each of these in detail below.
2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI
[RFC6480], RPKI Manifests [RFC6486], Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs), [RFC6482], the RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
[RFC8182], The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router
Protocol [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis], RPKI-based Prefix Validation,
[RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, [RFC8481].
3. Deployment Structure
Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure
as follows:
Cerification Authorities: The authoritative data of the RPKI are
published in a distributed set of servers, Certification
Authorities, at the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs (see [RFC6481]).
Relying Parties: Relying Parties are a local set of one or more
collected and verified caches of RPKI data. A Relying Party,
e.g., router or other client, MUST have a trust relationship with,
and a trusted transport channel to, any RP(s) it uses.
Note that RPs can pull from other RPs, thereby creating a somewhat
complex topology.
Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the RPKI to
Router Protocol described in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]. It is
said to be a client of the cache. There are mechanisms for the
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router to assure itself of the authenticity of the cache and to
authenticate itself to the cache.
4. Certification Authority Publishing
A principal constraint on publication timing is ensuring the CRL and
Manifest ([RFC6486]) are atomically correct with respect to the other
repository data. With rcynic, the directory must be atomically
correct before it becomes current. RRDP ([RFC8182]) is similar, the
directory must be atomically correct before it is published.
5. Replying Party Fetching
rcynic puts a load on RPKI publication point servers. Therefore
relying party caches have been discouraged from fetching more
frequently than on the order of an hour. Times as long as a day were
even suggested. With RRDP ([RFC8182]), these constraints are no
longer relevant.
A number of timers are embedded in the X.509 RPKI data which should
also be considered. E.g., CRL publication commitments, expiration of
EE certificates pointing to Manifests and the Manifests themselves.
Some CA operators commonly indicate new CRL information should be
available in the next 24 hours. These 24-hour sliding timers,
combined with fetching RPKI data once a day, cause needless
brittleness in the face of transient network issues between the CA
and RP.
6. Router Updating
The rate of change of ROA data can be estimated to remain small,
maybe on the order of a few ROAs a minute, but with bursts.
Therefore, the routers may update from the (presumed local) relying
party cache(s) quite frequently. Note that
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis] recommends a polling interval of one hour.
This conservative timing is because caches can send a Serial Notify
PDU to tell routers when there are new data to be fetched.
A router SHOULD respond with a Serial Query when it receives a Serial
Notify from a cache. If a router can not respond to a Serial Notify,
then it MUST send a periodic Serial Query no less frequently than
once an hour.
7. Alternative Technologies
Should the supply chain include components or technologies other than
those in IETF documents, the end effect SHOULD be the same; the
router(s) SHOULD react to invalid AS origins within the same overall
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time constraint, an hour at most from ROA creation at the CA
publication point to effect in the router.
8. Security Considerations
Route Origin Validation is not a security protocol. It is intended
to catch operational errors, and is easily gamed and attacked.
9. IANA Considerations
None
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-8210bis]
Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 2",
draft-ietf-sidrops-8210bis-00 (work in progress), March
2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
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[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8182] Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
"The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Massimiliano Stucchi.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com
Job Snijders
NTT Ltd.
Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
Amsterdam 1065 SZ
The Netherlands
Email: job@ntt.net
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