Internet DRAFT - draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress
draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk
Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom
Expires: December 1, 2019 J. Heitz
Cisco
May 30, 2019
BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-egress-01
Abstract
A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes
received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from
other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP
neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the
classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route,
which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs
such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other
modifications of the origin AS.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 1, 2019.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811]
of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case
of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of
correct implementation in this context.
As the origin AS may be modified by outbound policy, policy semantics
based on RPKI Origin Validation state MUST be able to be applied
separately on distribution into BGP and on egress.
When applied to egress policy, the effective origin AS MUST be used
to determine the Origin Validation state. The effective origin AS is
that which will actually be the origin AS in the announcement. It
might be affected by removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS
migration, etc. If there are any AS_PATH modifications resulting in
origin AS change, then these MUST be taken into account.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based
Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,
[RFC8481].
3. Egress Processing
BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation SHOULD
provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based
on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and
egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state
MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it
will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS
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may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly
available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path
manipulation, confederation handling, etc.
Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for
outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected,
static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly -
better support for the robustness principle.
4. Operational Considerations
Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced
origin AS may not be easily predicted before all policies have been
run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify an origin validation
policy which MUST BE run after such non-deterministic policies.
An operator SHOULD be able to list what announcements are not sent to
a peer because they were marked Invalid, as long as the router still
has them in memory.
5. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811] and [RFC8481].
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
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[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Email: randy@psg.com
Ruediger Volk
Deutsche Telekom
Jakob Heitz
Cisco
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: jheitz@cisco.com
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