Internet DRAFT - draft-ymbk-sidrops-rpki-has-no-identity
draft-ymbk-sidrops-rpki-has-no-identity
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Arrcus & Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track R. Housley
Expires: September 17, 2021 Vigil Security
March 16, 2021
The I in RPKI does not stand for Identity
draft-ymbk-sidrops-rpki-has-no-identity-00
Abstract
There is a false notion that Internet Number Resources (INRs) in the
RPKI can be associated with the real world identity of the 'owner' of
an INR. This document attempts to put that notion to rest.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 17, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The Bottom Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), see [RFC6480],
"represents the allocation hierarchy of IP address space and
Autonomous System (AS) numbers." Though since, it has grown to
include other similar resource and routing data.
In security terms the phrase "Public Key" implies there are also
private keys, a la [RFC5280]. And, as the RPKI has strong authority
over ownership of Internet Number Resources (INRs), there is a desire
to use the private keys to sign arbitrary documents to attest that
the 'owner' of those resources has attested to the authenticity of
those documents. Instead, it is an authorization to speak for the
named IP address blocks and AS numbers themselves, not their
unidentifiable owners.
There is a desire is to authenticate real world business transactions
with the signatures of INR holders. E.g. for Bill's Bait and Sushi
to use their AS in the RPKI to sign a Letter of Authorization (LOA)
for some other party to rack and stack hardware owned by BB&S.
Unfortunately, this is not formally feasible.
The I in RPKI actually stands for "Infrastructure," as in Resource
Public Key Infrastructure, not for "Identity". In fact, the RPKI
does not provide any association between INRs and the real world
holder(s) of those INRs. The RPKI provides authorization to speak
for the named IP address blocks and AS numbers.
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2. The Bottom Line
The RPKI was designed and specified to sign certificates for use
within the RPKI itself and to generate Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs), [RFC6480], for use in routing. It's design intentionally
precluded use for attesting to real world identity as, among other
issues, it would expose the Certification Authority (CA) to
liability.
That the RPKI does not authenticate real world identity is a feature
not a bug. If it tried to do so, aside from the liability, it would
end in a world of complexity with no proof of termination, as X.400
learned.
Registries such as the Regional Internet Resistries (RIRs) provide
INR to real world identity mapping through whois and similar
services. They claim to be authoritative, at least for for the INRs
which they allocate.
RPKI-based credentials of INRs MUST NOT be used to authenticate real
world documents or transactions without some formal external
authentication of the INR and the authority for the actually
anonymous INR holder to authenticate the particular document or
transaction.
3. Discussion
Normally, the INR holder does not hold the private key attesting to
their resources; the Certification Authority (CA) does. The INR
holder has a real world business relationship with the CA for which
they have likely signed real world documents.
As the INR owner does not have the keying material, they rely on the
CA, to which they presumably must present credentials, to manipulate
their INRs. These credentials may be userid/password (with two
factor authentication one hopes), a hardware token, client browser
certificates, etc.
Hence schemes such as [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] and
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc] must go to great lengths to extract the
supposedly relevant keys from the CA.
For some particular INR, say Bill's Bait and Sushi's Autonompus
System (AS) number, someone out on the net probably has the
credentials to the CA account in which BB&S's INRs are registered.
That could be the owner of BB&S, Roberto's Taco Stand, an IT vendor,
or the Government of Elbonia. One simply can not know.
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In large operations, INR management is often compartmentalized with
no authority over anything beyond dealing with INR registration. The
INR manager for Bill's Bait and Sushi is unlikely to be authorized to
conduct bank transactions for BB&S, or even to authorize access to
BB&S's servers in some colocation facility.
Then there is the temporal issue. The owner of that AS may be BB&S
today when some document was signed, and could be the Government of
Elbonia tomorrow. Or the resource could have been administratively
moved from one CA to another, likely requiring a change of keys. If
so, how does one determine if the signature on the real world
document is still valid?
While Ghostbuster Records [RFC6493] may seem to identify real world
entities, their semantic content is completely arbitrary, and does
not attest to INR ownership. They are merely clues for operational
support contact in case of technical RPKI problems.
Usually, before registering INRs, CAs require proof of INR ownership
via external documentation and authorities. It is somewhat droll
that the CPS Template, [RFC7382], does not mention any diligence the
CA must, or even might, conduct to assure the INRs are in fact owned
by a registrant.
Autonomous System Numbers do not identify real world entities. They
are identifiers some network operators 'own' and are only used in
loop detection in routing. They have no inherent semantics other
than uniqueness.
The RPKI base document, [RFC6480], Section 2.1 says explicitly "An
important property of this PKI is that certificates do not attest to
the identity of the subject."
The Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the
Resource PKI (RPKI) [RFC7382] Section 3.1, Naming, makes very clear
that "The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be meaningful;"
and goes on to do so at some length.
4. Security Considerations
Attempts to use RPKI data to authenticate real world documents or
other artifacts requiring identity are invalid and misleading.
When a document is signed with the private key associated with a RPKI
certificate, the signer is speaking for the INRs, the IP address
space and Autonomous System (AS) numbers, in the certificate. This
is not an identity; this is an authorization. In schemes such as
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta] and [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc] the
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signed message further narrows this scope of INRs. The INRs in the
message are a subset of the INRs in the certificate. If the
signature is valid, the message content comes from a party that is
authorized to speak for that subset of INRs.
Control of INRs for an entity could be used to falsely authorize
transactions or documents for which the INR manager has no authority.
RPKI-based credentials of INRs MUST NOT be used to authenticate real
world documents or transactions without some formal external
authentication of the INR and the authority for the actually
anonymous INR holder to authenticate the particular document or
transaction.
5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
6. Acknowledgments
The authors thank George Michaelson and Job Snijders for lively
discussion; and last but not least, Biff for the loan of Bill's Bait
and Sushi.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC7382] Kent, S., Kong, D., and K. Seo, "Template for a
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource
PKI (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 7382, DOI 10.17487/RFC7382,
April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc]
Snijders, J., "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
object profile for Signed Checklist (RSC)", draft-ietf-
sidrops-rpki-rsc-01 (work in progress), March 2021.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta]
Michaelson, G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels, T.,
and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged
Attestations (RTAs)", draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00 (work
in progress), January 2021.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, DOI 10.17487/RFC6493,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493>.
Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush
Arrcus & Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
US
Email: randy@psg.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA 20170
US
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
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