Internet DRAFT - draft-yusef-httpauth-srp-scheme
draft-yusef-httpauth-srp-scheme
HTTPAuth R. Shekh-Yusef
Internet-Draft Avaya
Intended status: Standards Track Y. Sheffer
Expires: July 21, 2016 Intuit
January 18, 2016
HTTP Secure Remote Password (SRP) Authentication Scheme
draft-yusef-httpauth-srp-scheme-02
Abstract
This document defines an HTTP Authentication Scheme that is based on
the Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol. The SRP protocol is an
Augmented Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol
suitable for authenticating users and exchanging keys over an
untrusted network.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Operations Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protection Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Discovery Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Initial Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Username Hashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Integration with Other Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
14. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
Some protocols (e.g. HTTP [HTTP-P7], SIP [RFC3261], OAUTH 2.0
[RFC6749], and STUN [RFC5389]) use a general framework for access
control and authentication, via a set of challenge-response
authentication schemes, which can be used by a server to challenge a
client request and by a client to provide authentication information.
Many of these systems that use the challenge-response framework rely
on passwords chosen by users which usually have low entropy and weak
randomness, and as a result cannot be used as cryptographic keys.
While cannot be used directly as cryptographic keys, the passwords
can still be used to derive cryptographic keys.
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This document defines an HTTP Authentication Scheme that is based on
the Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol. The SRP protocol is an
Augmented Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol
suitable for authenticating users and exchanging keys over an
untrusted network, based on a shared password, without requiring a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or any trusted third party.
The SRP protocol provides many security benefits: it resists
dictionary attacks mounted by either passive or active network
intruders. It also offers perfect forward secrecy, which protects
past sessions and passwords against future compromises. Finally,
user passwords are stored in a form that is not plaintext-equivalent
to the password itself, so an attacker who captures the password
database cannot use it directly to compromise security and gain
immediate access to the host.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Operations Overview
The SRP protocol relies on finite field GF(large-prime), which means
that during its setup, the server must choose a large prime number
(large-prime), for the integers from 1 to (large-prime - 1) to form a
group under multiplication modulo large-prime. The server must also
choose a primitive root modulo large-prime (generator) for this
group.
All values in this document are computed modulo large-prime.
When a user account is created, the server selects a hash function
and a user salt, and uses a realm and the user password to create a
password-verifier as follows:
derived-private-key = H(username:realm:password:salt)
password-verifier = generator ^ derived-private-key
The server then discards the derived-private-key and stores the
following information in the database: username, hash-algorithm,
salt, and password-verifier.
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The following flow describes at a high-level the flow of messages
based on the challenge-response framework:
Client Server
-------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
Discovery of the protection space stage (optional) |
| |
| Authorization: SRP |
|------------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| WWW-Authenticate: SRP |
| realm="realm" |
|<-------------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
Mutual AuthN and establishment of session-key stage |
| |
| Authorization: SRP |
| username="username" |
|------------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| WWW-Authenticate: SRP |
| large-prime="large-prime" |
| generator="generator" |
| hash-algorithm="hash-algorithm" |
| salt="salt", |
| server-public-key="server-public-key" |
|<-------------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| Authorization: SRP |
| server-public-key="server-public-key" |
| client-public-key="client-public-key" |
| client-pop="client-pop" |
|------------------------------------------------------------->|
| |
| WWW-Authenticate: SRP |
| server-pop="server-pop" |
|<-------------------------------------------------------------|
| |
| |
| |
| |
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If the client is not aware of the realm associated with the resources
it is trying to access, then the initial request will include the SRP
scheme with no parameters. This will allow the server to discover
the client's capabilities and to challenge the request and provide
the client with the realm associated with the resource. The client
is then expected to retry the request with the username parameter.
The client then initiates the authentication process with the server
by sending an initial request with an Authorization header with SRP
scheme which includes the username parameter associated with that
protection space.
The server generates its private key and calculates its associated
public key, then challenges the request and includes the WWW-
Authenticate with the large-prime, generator, hash-algorithm, salt,
and server-public-key.
The client calculates the session-key and re-tries the request and
includes an Authorization header with client-pop to prove to the
server that it is in possession of the session-key.
The server verifies the client-pop and calculates the server-pop to
prove to the client that it is in possession of the same session-key.
At the end of the above process, the client and the server would have
established a communication channel after completing a mutual
authentication, and each side would be in possession of the same
session-key.
3. Protection Space
The HTTP Authentication Framework [RFC7235] defines "protection
space" as a combination of the canonical root URI of the server being
accessed and the "realm" value. The "realm" values allow the
partitioning of the server resources into a set of protection spaces,
each with its own authentication scheme and/or authorization
database.
A protection space determines the scope of protection covered by a
set of credentials that can be applied automatically. If a prior
request has been authorized, then the client may reuse the same
credentials for all other requests within that protection space, for
a period of time determined by the server.
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4. Discovery Request
If the client is not aware of the realm associated with the resource
it needs to access, then the discovery request MUST be sent without
any parameters, to allow the server to challenge the request and send
the realm to the client. The client is then expected to retry the
request with the username associated with the realm of the resource
being accessed to initiate the authentication process.
5. Initial Request
The initial request from the client, that starts the authentication
process, MUST include an Authorization header field with the SRP
scheme.
The request MUST include the following parameter:
username
The user's name in a specific realm.
6. Challenge
If a discovery request is received from the client, then the server
MUST challenge the request by responding with 401 and MUST include
the realm parameter. The client is expected to retry the request and
include the username parameter to start the authentication process.
When the server receives the request with the username parameter, the
server looks up the hash-algorithm, salt, and password-verifier
associated with the username provided by the client in the initial
request.
OPEN ISSUE:
{ To prevent an attacker from identifying the usernames in the DB, if
a username does not exist in the DB, the server should still go
through the motion of attempting to authenticate the user and fail it
only during the last step, to prevent the attacker from recognizing
the username existence by analyzing how fast the server responds to
the initial request. }
The server generates a random number, [1, large-prime - 1], as a
server ephemeral private key (server-private-key), and computes the
associated server ephemeral public key. The server MUST generate a
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fresh ephemeral private key for each authentication session, even if
the request is coming from the same user.
The server calculates the server-public-key as follows:
server-public-key = H( 3 * password-verifier + generator ^ server-
private-key )
The server then challenges the initial request from the client by
responding with a "401 Unauthorized" status code and a WWW-
Authenticate header field with and SRP scheme. The header field MUST
include the following parameters:
large-prime
The large prime used to form the finite field GF(n) group,
selected by the server during setup, formatted as a decimal
integer.
generator
A finite field GF(n) group generator selected by the server
during setup, formatted as a decimal integer.
hash-algorithm
The hash algorithm used to create the session-key, e.g SHA256.
salt
A random string used as user's salt.
server-public-key
The server ephemeral public key associated with the server
ephemeral private key.
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7. Response
The client generates a random number, [1, large-prime - 1], as a
client ephemeral private key (client-private-key), and computes the
associated client ephemeral public key as follows:
client-public-key = generator ^ client-private-key
The client calculates the derived-private-key, random nonce, session-
tag, session-key, and client-pop as follows:
derived-private-key = H( username:realm:password:salt )
nonce = H( client-public-key : server-public-key )
session-tag = ( server-public-key - 3 * generator ^ derived-
private-key) ^ (client-private-key + nonce * derived-private-key )
session-key = H ( session-tag )
client-pop = H( client-public-key : server-public-key : session-
tag )
The client is expected to retry the request passing an Authorization
header field with SRP scheme. The header field MUST include the
following parameters:
server-public-key
The server ephemeral public key that the client received from
the server with the challenge request.
client-public-key
The client ephemeral public key associated with the client
ephemeral private key.
client-pop
A client proof-of-possession to prove to the server that the
client is possession of the session-key.
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8. Confirmation
The server MAY use the server-public-key received from the client to
correlate this request with the previous response it sent to the
client. This especially important in the case that this request is
received on a different connection than the one that delivered the
initial request.
The server calculates a random nonce and the session-tag as follows:
nonce = H( client-public-key : server-public-key )
session-tag = ( client-public-key * password-verifier ^ nonce ) ^
server-private-key
At this stage, the server has enough information to verify the
client-pop by locally calculating the expected-client-pop and
comparing it to the one received from the client. The server
calculates the expected-client-pop as follows:
expected-client-pop = H( client-public-key : server-public-key :
session-tag )
The server then compares the expected-client-pop to the client-pop.
If they are different, then the server MUST fail the request by
responding with a "401 Unauthorized" status code and follow the same
procedure used with the initial request.
If the expected-client-pop is the same as the client-pop received
from the client, the server continues the process and calculates its
server-pop and session-key as follows:
server-pop = H( client-public-key : client-pop : session-tag )
session-key = H ( session-tag )
The server then confirms the client's request by responding with 200
OK request. The 200 OK message MUST include an Authentication-Info
header field with the SRP scheme. The header field MUST include the
following parameter:
server-pop
A server proof-of-possession to prove to the client that the
server is possession of the session-key.
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When the client receives the confirmation from the server it verifies
the server-pop by calculating the expected-server-pop and comparing
it to the server-pop. If these values are different, then the client
MUST consider the authentication process to have failed; otherwise,
the authentication process is complete, and both sides would be in
possession of the same session-key.
9. Username Hashing
TBD: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7616#section-3.4.4
10. Internationalization Considerations
TBD: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7616#section-4
11. Integration with Other Protocols
12. Security Considerations
13. IANA Considerations
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14. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2945] Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System",
RFC 2945, September 2000.
[SRP6] Wu, T., "SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure
Remote Password Protocol", IEEE P1363 Working
Group http://srp.stanford.edu/srp6.ps, October 2002.
Authors' Addresses
Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
Avaya
250 Sidney Street
Belleville, Ontario
Canada
Phone: +1-613-967-5267
EMail: rifaat.ietf@gmail.com
Yaron Sheffer
Intuit
4 HaHarash St.
Hod HaSharon 4524075
Israel
EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
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