Internet DRAFT - draft-zhang-btns-icmp-sec-extension
draft-zhang-btns-icmp-sec-extension
Network Working Group Qingshan. Zhang
Internet-Draft Alcatel Shanghai Bell
Intended status: Standards Track September 2006
Expires: March 5, 2007
Extension of ICMP Security Failures Messages
draft-zhang-btns-icmp-sec-extension-00.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
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Abstract
RFC2521 defines ICMP security failures messages for indicating
failures when using IP Security Protocols (AH and ESP). This
document presents extension of those messages, which make use of some
reserved field to specify sub types of failures.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Message formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Not Classified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Name Unauthorized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Data Sensitivity Level Unauthorized . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Transport Layer Protocol Unauthorized . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Source Port Unauthorized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Destination Port Unauthorized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Processing Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Processing Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Cooperation between New and Old Systems . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Introduction
[RFC2521] is intended for use with the Internet Security Protocols
([RFC2401] etc.) for authentication and privacy. These messages
covers all the failure types of IPSec traffic, but the granularity of
some failures specified in the failure messages is larger than that
provided by IPSec protocol suite.
In order to make full use of the IPSec traffic granularity, extension
of the failure messages is introduced in this document, which
subdivides some failure types according to the minimum granularity of
IPSec traffic.
The format of ICMP security failure messages are defined in
[RFC2521]. The ICMP type of these messages is 40 (Security
Failures).
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3. Message formats
Below is the format of ICMP security failures messages with the
subcode extension. It is different from the original format
([RFC2521]) at the reserved field. The first half of the reserved
field is used as the "Subcode" field, which indicates sub types of
security failures specified by the "Code" field.
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Code | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Subcode | Reserved | Pointer |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Original Internet Headers + 64 bits of Payload ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type: 40
Code: Indicates the kind of failure:
0 = Bad SPI
1 = Authentication Failed
2 = Decompression Failed
3 = Decryption Failed
4 = Need Authentication
5 = Need Authorization
Subcode: Indicates the sub kind of failure:
0 = Not Classified
If Code = 0~4, values of the subcode MAY be defined in future if
necessary.
If Code = 5, the subcode is defined as below:
1 = Name Unauthorized
2 = Data Sensitivity Level Unauthorized
3 = Transport Layer Protocol Unauthorized
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4 = Source Port Unauthorized
5 = Destination Port Unauthorized
Otherwise, the subcode MUST be set to zero.
Reserved: 1 octet. For future use; MUST be set to zero when
transmitted, and MUST be ignored when received.
Other fields such as "Checksum", "Pointer", "Original Internet
Headers ..." are right the same as those of [RFC2521].
The values of the "Code" field have the same meanings as defined in
[RFC2521].
The values of subcode for "Need Authorization" are defined according
to different selectors provided by IPSec, which determine the
granularity of IPSec traffics. Meanings of these values are
elaborated as below.
3.1. Not Classified
This value is used for all failure types (Code=0~5). It indicates
that a received datagram will not be accepted because there is a
failure with the datagram, but the receptor does not specify sub
types of this failure.
3.2. Name Unauthorized
Indicates that a received datagram will not be accepted because
either no name information, or inappropriate name information is
presented. (There are 2 cases of name information supported in IPSec
DOI - User ID and System Name.)
In the case of receipt of a datagram with an ESP header, the name
information is "OPAQUE" before decryption. The receptor SHOULD check
the name information in this datagram after decryption, and generate
a "Name Unauthorized" message if the name information of the datagram
mismatches the name selector.
3.3. Data Sensitivity Level Unauthorized
Indicates that a received datagram will not be accepted because
either no data sensitivity information, or inappropriate data
sensitivity level is presented.
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3.4. Transport Layer Protocol Unauthorized
Indicates that a received datagram will not be accepted because the
party is not authorized to access the destination host with the
transport protocol in the datagram.
If the transport protocol in a datagram is "OPAQUE" (in ESP format),
the receptor SHOULD check the transport protocol in this datagram
after decryption, and generate a "Transport Protocol Unauthorized"
message if the transport protocol of the datagram mismatches the
transport protocol selector.
3.5. Source Port Unauthorized
Indicates that a received datagram will not be accepted because the
party is not allowed to access the destination through the source
port.
If the source port information in a datagram is "OPAQUE" (in ESP
format), the receptor SHOULD check it in this datagram after
decryption, and generate a "Source Port Unauthorized" message if the
source port of the datagram is beyond the corresponding selector.
3.6. Destination Port Unauthorized
Indicates that a received datagram will not be accepted because the
party is not allowed to access the destination port.
If the destination port information in a datagram is "OPAQUE" (in ESP
format), the receptor SHOULD check it in this datagram after
decryption, and generate a "Destination Port Unauthorized" message if
the destination port of the datagram mismatches the corresponding
selector.
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4. Processing Procedures
4.1. Processing Order
When a datagram with the failure of "Need Authorization" arrives, the
receptor checks it in turn to find out what is the subtype of the
failure happening in the datagram. That means the receptor checks
whether the "Name Unauthorized" failure happens, then comes to the
next one - "Data Sensitivity Level Unauthorized", and so on. The
receptor takes the first failure it figures out as the subtype of the
"Need Authorization" failure and feeds it back in an ICMP message to
the party.
4.2. Cooperation between New and Old Systems
If the receptor implements the standard of [RFC2521], while the party
implements this one, the receptor does not specify the subtype of the
failure happening in the datagram from the party, but fills the
reserved field with zero. When the party gets the ICMP security
failure message from the receptor, it finds out the type of the
failure from the "Code" field. Since the "Subcode" field is filled
up with zero, the party takes the subtype of the failure as "Not
Classified".
On the contrary, if the party implements the old standard ([RFC2521])
while the receptor implements the new one, the party just ignores the
"Subcode" field in which the receptor specifies the subtype of the
failure in the datagram it receives from the party.
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5. Acknowledgements
Members of our research group provided help and suggestions to this
document.
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6. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2401] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2402] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
RFC 2402, November 1998.
[RFC2406] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[RFC2463] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998.
[RFC2521] Karn, P. and W. Simpson, "ICMP Security Failures
Messages", RFC 2521, March 1999.
[RFC3232] Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by
an On-line Database", RFC 3232, January 2002.
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Author's Address
Qingshan Zhang
Alcatel Shanghai Bell
388#, Ningqiao Road, Pudong District
Shanghai
China
Phone: +86 21 28978285
Email: Qingshan.ZHANG@alcatel-sbell.com.cn
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