Internet DRAFT - draft-zhang-stir-scenario-issue

draft-zhang-stir-scenario-issue







STIR                                                       C. Zhang, Ed.
Internet-Draft                       China Mobile Group Design Institute
Intended status: Informational                                   H. Deng
Expires: January 7, 2016                 China Mobile Research Institute
                                                            July 6, 2015


                    Issue with current STIR scenario
                   draft-zhang-stir-scenario-issue-00

Abstract

   This document introduces couple of scenarios have been identified to
   find out that certificate based solution has some limitation.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2016.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   The work item "Technical measures and mechanism on countering the
   spoofed call in the terminating network of VoLTE (ITU-T X.ticsc,
   supplement to ITU-T X.1245)" was established by ITU-T SG17 in Sept,
   2014.

   However, before the implementation of the mechanism by VoLTE is
   taken, the work item of X.ticsc is to focus on the countering
   measures in the following three scenarios existing in the current
   networks:

   We have some definition of the terminology below:

   IPBX: Internet-protocol Private Branch Exchange (note: IPBX is the
   exit of the caller's private network)

   MSC: Mobile Switching Center

   LSTP: Low Signaling Transfer Point

   HSTP: High singaling Transfer Point

   VoLTE AS: Voice over LTE Application Server

   1.  The caller and caller's visiting/home network are not all in the
   trusted domain like below figure 1 and 2.



















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    Bad Guy:                         Bad guy:
    Make a Call                      Turn Real Number:83658173
    +---------+    A Call with       To Faked Number:10086
    |Telephony|    a internal Number +------------------+
    |Terminal |--------------------->|       IPBX       +--+
    +---------+                      +------------------+  | A Call with
                                                           | 10086
                                                         +-+-----+
                                                         |  MSC  |
                                                         +-+-----+
    +----------+                                           | A Call with
    | Exchange |                      +-----------------+  | 10086
    | Gateway  |<---------------------|       LSP       |<-+
    | to other |    A Call with       +-----------------+
    | Networks |    0531-10086         Add Area Number:
    +----------+                       0531


                    Figure 1: Caller cannot be trusted

    Bad Guy:
    Make a Call
    +---------+  A Call with             A Call with
    |Mobile   |  13356784321   +-----+   13356784321    +------+
    |Phone    |--------------->| MSC |----------------->| LSTP |
    +---------+                +-----+                  +---+--+
                                                            |
                                                            |A Call with
                                                            |13356784321
    +----------+                                      +-----+------+
    | Exchange |                                      |            |
    | Gateway  |<-------------------------------------|  VoLTE AS  |
    | to other |        A Call with                   |            |
    | Networks |        13201010086                   +------------+
    +----------+                                       Bad Guy:
                                                       Turn Real Number:
                                                       13356784321
                                                       To Faked Number:
                                                       13201010086


      Figure 2: The caller's visiting /home network cannot be trusted

   2.  The calling ID is real and can be trusted, but highly similar to
   some public service numbers, for example, a real mobile phone number
   of 132-010-10086 is quite similar to China Mobile's service number
   10086.  Some bad guy could use it to make fraud against the customers
   of China Mobile.



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   3.  The international calling ID can be presented incompletely to the
   callee according to some international exchange rules.  If the
   calling ID is hidden intentionally and legally by the caller in an
   international call like the figure 3, the presented caller number
   could be the 00 + country code + area code.  While, 00 + country code
   + area code could be petty similar to some public service numbers
   also.  For example, 95 is the country code of Myanmar and also the
   first two numbers of many public service numbers of banks in China.
   And plus some area codes, a bad caller in Myanmar could mimic many
   public service numbers of banks in China and cheat the customers of
   these banks easily.

   Bad Guy:
   Make a Call                                         Add Area Number:
   +---------+  A Call with             A Call with    5330
   |Mobile   |  number hidden +-----+   number hidden  +------+
   |Phone    |--------------->| MSC |----------------->| LSTP |
   +---------+                +-----+                  +---+--+
                                                           |
                                                           |A Call with
                                                           |5330
                       +--------------+               +----+-------+
                       | International|               |            |
    <------------------| Gateway      |<--------------|    HSTP    |
       A Call with     | to other     |  A Call With  |            |
       00955330        | Networks     |  955330       +------------+
                       +--------------+              Add Country Number:
                       Add International              95
                       header:00


       Figure 3: The caller just hid the ID in a international call

   By proposing the integrated measures of detecting and verifying,
   blocking, alerting and etc., X.ticsc dedicates to solve the concerns
   in these three scenarios listed above at least to some extent.  Yet,
   the rsisk in the scenario 2 and 3 may still not be solved
   systematically even when the mechanism of the end-to-end
   authentication is implemented.

   Meanwhile, editors of X.ticsc would appreciate any closer
   collaboration with the IETF STIR to share the ideas and enhance the
   quality of X.ticsc.  Just for mention, a new LS/o (TD 1782) has been
   sent out to IETF STIR by ITU-T SG17 on April of this year.

   Any further discussion would be welcome!





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Authors' Addresses

   Chen Zhang (editor)
   China Mobile Group Design Institute
   A16, Danleng Street
   Beijing
   China

   Email: zhangchen@cmdi.chinamobile.com


   Hui Deng
   China Mobile Research Institute
   Xuanwumenxi Ave. No.32
   Beijing  100053
   China

   Email: denghui@chinamobile.com

































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