Internet DRAFT - draft-zhou-rrg-lp-wsn
draft-zhou-rrg-lp-wsn
Network Working Group L. Zhou
Internet-Draft J. Huang
Expires: November 29, 2014 SouthEast University
May 28, 2014
The Location Privacy of Wireless Sensor Networks: Attacks and
Countermeasures
draft-zhou-rrg-lp-wsn-00
Abstract
With the related applications of wireless sensor networks getting
into our lives quickly, the research of WSN is growing more and more
necessary. The most significant problem which threatens the
successful deployment of sensor systems is privacy, there are many
protocols providing the security of news content for the WSNs.
However, due to the open feature of sensor networks, context
information is still in an exposed state, which makes the network be
vulnerable to traffic analysis attack and hop by hop tracing back
packet attack. Thus location privacy protection programs have been
proposed. In this paper, we analyze and compare the existing major
schemes comprehensively, meanwhile illustrate their theoretical
models, principles and the advantages and disadvantages in detail.
Status of This Memo
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. The Attack Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. The Model of Source Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. The Model of Sink Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Location Privacy Protection Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Source Location Privacy Protection Protocols . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Phantom Routing (PhR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Protocol Using Source-based Restricted Flooding
(PUSBRF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Sink Location Privacy Protection Protocols . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Location-privacy Routing Protocol (LPR) . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. Differential Enforced Fractal Propagation (DEFP) . . 8
3.3. Both Location Privacy Protection Protocols . . . . . . . 8
4. Performance Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. IANA Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
With the rise of Internet of things, wireless sensor network (WSN)
which is an integral part of Internet of things have a very broad
application prospects.
WSNs consist of a large number of micro sensor nodes, those nodes are
capable of sensing information, computing and communicating.
However, due to the low cost of these nodes, the storage capacity of
battery is small, the computing capability of node processors is low,
and the communication of wireless communication device is limited.
Overall wireless sensor networks have the following characteristics:
large-scale, self-organizing, multi-hop routing, dynamic, resource-
constrained and applications related. These features make the
wireless sensor networks have broad application prospects in
military, environment, medical treatment, smart home.
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Wireless sensor networks could be used to collect sensitive
information or deployed in hostile or unprotected environment, which
make protecting the privacy of sensor nodes be crucial in the current
WSNs, the privacy issues in WSNs are divided into two categories:
content privacy and context privacy. In order to solve the problem
of content privacy, for now, many encryption and authentication
mechanisms[RFC4948][RFC4949]have been proposed and used, and can
basically meet the corresponding requirements. But due to the open
feature of WSNs, the exposure of context information can cause the
user's secret leak to the attacker, especially attacker can locate
the source node or destination node (base station) through traffic
analysis and hop track packet stream. The location of source node
and base station are very sensitive in many WSN applications such as
in precious animals detection system, the position of animals (source
node) can't be exposed to illegal hunters; in battlefield information
collection system, the position of soldier (sink node) who accepts a
variety of information can't be exposed to the enemy. Because of the
importance and necessity of location privacy, this paper has a
research on principles, advantages and disadvantages of current main
location privacy protection agreement (PhR[PhR](GROW[GROW], PRLA
[PRLA]), PUSBRF[PUSBRF], LPR [LPR], LPSS[LPSS], DEFP[DEFP]).
Based on the property of object which needs to be protected, this
paper divides the possible attackers into two categories: the
attackers who attack source node and the attackers who attack sink
node, and establishes corresponding models according to their
individual features. According to the attacker models we propose
appropriate protection agreements and discuss their advantages and
disadvantages.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We divide possible attackers into two categories based on the
property of object which needs to be protected for the first time,
and establish the corresponding attack models;
(2) We put forward the corresponding settlement agreements in
accordance with attack models on the basis of scientific ideas that
discovering problems then solving them, meanwhile we conduct
comprehensive analyses and comparisons on the main location privacy
protection agreements systematically for the first time;
(3) We summarize the maximum intensity attacker that each privacy
protection agreement can handle by analyzing and comparing, then
conclude the respective applicable scenario of each agreement.
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2. The Attack Models
The objects protected in WSNs are usually the source node (such as in
precious animals detection system, the position of the node which has
monitored animals can't be exposed to illegal hunters) and the sink
node (such as in battlefield information collection system, the
location of the last node which is responsible for transferring a
variety of information to the soldiers can't be exposed to the
enemy). According to the property of object which needs to be
protected we divide possible attackers into two categories: the
attackers who attack source node (source attackers) and the attackers
who attack sink node (sink attackers). This article assumes that two
types of attackers both have the following characteristics: ①
attackers have excellent hardware, sufficient storage space and
powerful computation ability; ② attackers can detect traffic
only in one region, but are not capable of decrypting data packets
[PRLA]; ③ attackers can only trace the nodes sending data
packets but the nodes receiving data packets.
2.1. The Model of Source Attackers
The process of attacker tracing back source node's location is
described as follows: the attacker starts monitoring at the sink
node, when monitored a message, he can deduce that the signal is
issued by node A through wireless signal positioning device, then
moves immediately to node A to continue to wait, when a new message
received he determines that it was issued by node B and then quickly
moves to node B, repeat this process can trace to the location of the
source node.
This paper divides the source attackers into two categories based on
the sources attackers' tracking method: the patient source attacker
and the careful source attacker.
The model of patient source attacker is described as follows: the
attacker follows a simple and natural attack strategy: he starts on
the position of sink node (base station) to wait until a new message
is heard, and then immediately move to the node that generated the
message, repeat this process until the location of the source node is
traced.
The model of cautious source attacker is described as follows:
because some privacy protection technology [3] could lead an attacker
to strand at a location remote from the real source node, the
strategy of cautious source attacker is limiting the eavesdropping
time in one position, if he has not received any new messages within
a specified time interval, he thinks that he was misled to current
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position, and then hops back to the previous position to continue
listening.
2.2. The Model of Sink Attackers
Sink attackers determine which nodes are on the transmission path
according to the time sequence of date packet transmission, then
mobile hop by hop, and finally get to the sink node. The process of
attacker tracking sink node's position is described as follows:
assuming the attacker listening for message transmitting within the
range of one hop at node C, he monitors that node C sends a data
packet at first, then node B transmits a data packet subsequently,
the attacker moves to the node B immediately and infers that the
transmission path at this time is C to B, according to this method,
the attacker tracks the location of the nodes which are one hop from
the base station as having captured the sink node.
Similarly sink attackers are also divided into two categories: the
patient sink attacker and the cautious sink attacker. The principle
of their attacker model is similar to the principle of corresponding
source attacker model, not repeat them.
3. Location Privacy Protection Agreements
In order to prevent these attackers from destroying the location
privacy security of wireless sensor networks, a series of security
protocols are proposed, such as: phantom routing (PhR), source
location privacy preservation protocol in wireless sensor networks
using source-based restricted flooding (PUSBRF), location-privacy
routing protocol (LPR), location privacy support scheme (LPSS),
differential enforced fractal propagation (DEFP). This section will
classify these main protocols and describe the principle of each
protocol in detail.
In this paper, we divide the main privacy and security protocols
which are mentioned above into three categories: source location
privacy protection protocols, sink location privacy protection
protocols and both location privacy protection protocol. Source
location privacy protection protocols include: PhR, PUSBRF; sink
location privacy protection protocols include: LPR, DEFP; and both
location privacy protection protocol includes LPSS.
3.1. Source Location Privacy Protection Protocols
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3.1.1. Phantom Routing (PhR)
Take the panda-hunter model[PhR] for example, the description of
phantom routing is decribed as follows: in PhR , the transmission of
each information goes through two phases:① the random walk
phase , may be a pure random walk or a directional walk (based on
sector or hop count between the node and the sink node[PhR]);②
subsequent flooding/single-path routing phase, which will send the
information to the sink. When the source node sends a message, the
message is unicasted Hwalk hops randomly, then pass it to the base
station based on the baseline (probability) flooding[SECH]or single-
path routing[PhR]. Because of PhR, after an attacker intercepted
messages i he will wait a long time before receiving the next message
i+1, when he finally receives the message i+1, the instant sender of
this message may lead the attacker to the position which is away from
the true source node.
On the basis of phantom routing (PhR) also proposed the phantom
routing with location angle (PRLA)[SECE], PRLA is consist of three
phases:① the sink node floods a query message in the whole
network, so that each node can creates the shortest path to the sink
and divides its neighboring nodes into two direction collections
according to the distance between neighboring nodes and the
sink;② the source node produces a limited flooding with the
range of random walk, this process makes each node can get the
inclination angle of respective neighboring nodes and calculate the
transmitting messages possibility of each neighboring node;③
the source node sends date packets to the sink node, each data packet
will be transmitted Hw hops in a random walk way based on the
inclination angle, then along the shortest route path goes to the
sink node from the phantom source node.
PRLA is essentially an improvement of PhR's random walk phase, to a
degree it avoids the generation of the offset path[PUSBRF], on the
basis of PhR it further improves the safety time.
Greedy random walk (GROW) is essentially an improvement of PhR's
random walk phase too, in GROW, the sensor node each time selects a
neighboring node from those who did not participate in the random
walk phase, in this way, random walking is always trying to cover a
area where hasn't accessed to by greedy strategy[GROW], thereby
improving the ability of sensor networks against attackers.
3.1.2. Protocol Using Source-based Restricted Flooding (PUSBRF)
PUSBRF protocol is consist of four phases:① network security
initialization phase;② source node h hops limited flooding
phase;③ h hops directional routing phase, the direction of each
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hop is selected by the current node based on the minimum hop value
that its neighboring apart from the source node;④ the shortest
path routing phase.
The process of network initialization phase is described as follows:
complete the establishment of the key, discover the neighboring nodes
to achieve the information of minimum hop value that each ordinary
nodes apart from the base station, and each node pre-loads the
following parameters: the public key (Kpub) used for message
encryption, the list of neighboring nodes (Tu), hop value h, then
generate a base-station broadcast in the whole network, the base
station broadcasts the initialization message BM={BRO_BASE,ID,hop_bs}
in the entire network, in which BRO_BASE indicates the type of
messages, ID indicates the identity of the node that sent the
message, hop_bs indicates the hop count of the message which is
initially 0., PRLA is consist of three phases:① the sink node
floods a query message in the whole network, so that each node can
creates the shortest path to the sink and divides its neighboring
nodes into two direction collections according to the distance
between neighboring nodes and the sink;② the source node
produces a limited flooding with the range of random walk, this
process makes each node can get the inclination angle of respective
neighboring nodes and calculate the transmitting messages possibility
of each neighboring node;③ the source node sends date packets
to the sink node, each data packet will be transmitted Hw hops in a
random walk way based on the inclination angle, then along the
shortest route path goes to the sink node from the phantom source
node.
The process of the source node h hops limited flooding phase is
described as follows: it makes the source node realize the broadcast
in whole network within h hops, each node which is in the rage of h
hops from the source node gets the minimal distance between itself
and the source, then in list Tu adds the minimal hop value that the
neighboring nodes away from the source node and records the value.
The phantom source nodes generated in h hops directional routing
phase are far enough away from the real source node and their
location is diverse. The shortest path routing achieves transmitting
packets from the phantom source node to the base station in a
shortest period of time.
3.2. Sink Location Privacy Protection Protocols
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3.2.1. Location-privacy Routing Protocol (LPR)
Because the goal of routing protocols is to transmit a packet along
the shortest possible path to the destination, the packets'
forwarding direction is always pointing to the receiver. Then the
attacker will determine the wright node which the real package goes
to according to the general trend of path. In order to resist this
kind of problem LPR protocol has been proposed.
LPR randomizes routing path, so that the forward direction of
packages does not always point to the receiver. The route consists
of two phases: ① each sensor node divides his neighboring nodes
into two lists: a closer list which is consist of the neighboring
nodes whose distance to the destination is shorter than its own; a
further list which is consist of the neighboring nodes whose distance
to the destination is longer than equal to its own, the specific
classification criteria refer to the literature [LPR]. ②When a
sensor node forwards a date packet, he chooses a neighbor node in one
of the two lists randomly as the next hop node of the package, and
the selection probability from the further list as the next hop node
is Pf, so the selection probability from the closer list as the next
hop node is 1-Pf.
3.2.2. Differential Enforced Fractal Propagation (DEFP)
DEFP is a simple distributed algorithm based on DFP[DEFP]. The key
idea of the program is to leave early packet forwarding nodes have a
higher chance of false packet transmission in the next phase, at the
beginning DEFP allocates one vote to every neighboring node. When a
node selects one of his neighboring nodes as the next node which is
false packets forwarded to, the votes of the node increase k.
According to this approach, after using lottery scheduling algorithm
[SECH], when a node has forwarded a fake packet to one of its
neighboring nodes, it will continue to forward other fake packets to
the same neighboring node with rising probability.
3.3. Both Location Privacy Protection Protocols
The program consists of two phases:① Each sensor node divides
his neighboring nodes into three sets: a small gradient [SECT]set
comprised of the neighboring nodes with smaller gradient value; an
equivalent gradient set comprised of the neighboring nodes with the
same gradient value; a large gradient comprised of the neighboring
nodes with larger gradient value. ② When a neighboring node
transmits a packet, he selects the next hop node from the equivalent
gradient set with the probability Pi, or selects the next hop node
from the small gradient set with the probability 1-Pi. LPSS also can
be used combine with the fake package strategy.
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4. Performance Comparison
This section compares the performance of the location privacy
security protocols mainly by three parameters: security strength
(safety time), transmission delay, communication overhead.
(1) Safety time (privacy protection strength): the number of packages
sent by the source node before the target node exposed to the enemy
(before hunters capturing the panda or enemy discovering soldiers who
receive information), the more of packages be sent the longer of
safety period, conversely the shorter of safety period;
(2) Energy loss (communication overhead): the average hop value
through which the data packet sent by the source node eventually
arrives at the sink node (base station), and the lager of the hop
value the greeter of communication overhead, conversely the smaller
of communication overhead;
(3) Propagation delay (transmission delay): the period in which the
data packet sent by the source node eventually arrives at the sink
node (base station), obviously lager of the average hop value the
longer of transmission delay, conversely the shorter of transmission
delay. Combining with the consequence in (2) can easily conclude
that the communication overhead is proportional to transmission
delay.
In order to facilitate the comparison, source location privacy
protection protocols all use the same simulation configuration: in
the OMNet[SECT]simulation environment, we distribute 10000 sensor
nodes uniformly in the network with area of 6000*6000 m2, in which
the communication radius of each node is 110m. So the average number
of neighboring nodes of each node is 8.64, weakly connected nodes
(node number of neighboring nodes is less than or equal to 3) account
for only about 1%, the attackers begin tracking from the base
station.
The communication overhead is closely related to two parameters: the
hop value of random walks and the distance between the source node
and the base station. When research the changing trend with one
parameter, we need to assume the other parameter as a fixed value.
Assume that the distance between the source node and the base station
are 60 hops, the relationship between communication overhead and hop
count of random directional walks shows that:① With the number
of random directional hops increasing, the communication overhead
(average transmission delay) of PhR and PUSBRF both increase. This
is because with the number of random directional hops increasing,
date packets need forward more times during random routing phase to
reach phantom source nodes, however, this phase doesn't make
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contribution to pass packets to the base station, thus their
communication overhead improves.② When the random directed hop
value is fixed, the communication overhead of PUSBRF is slightly
higher, because the directed walk of PhR is based on the number of
hops between the node to the base station, so PhR only need the base
station broadcast in the whole network, but from the above mentioned
phases of PUSBRF protocol we can see, PUSBRF requires not only the
base station broadcast in the whole network but also needs the source
node broadcast in the whole network within h hops.
Make the value of random directional hops as h=15, then the trend of
the two protocols between the communication overhead and hops from
the source node to the base station shows that: ① the
communication overhead (average transmission delay) of PhR and PUSBRF
both increase with the distance between the source node and the base
station increasing. This is because with increasing distance between
the source node and the base station, the data needs to go through
more hops to reach the base station.② when the hop value of two
protocols between the source node and the base station are the same,
the communication overhead of them are about the same.
(3) The security period is closely related to two parameters: the
value of random directional hops and the distance from the source
node to the base station. Assume that the distance between the
source node and the base station are 60 hops, then the trend of the
security period and the random directional hop value shows that:
① The security period of PhR and PUSBRF both increase with h
increasing. This is because the increasing h makes the distance
between the phantom source nodes generated by two protocols and the
real source node further, then generates more random paths which make
the source attackers more difficult to trace. ② When the random
directional hop value are the same, the security period of PUSBRF is
much longer than PhR's, this indicates that the safety performance of
PUSBRF is better than PhR's. This is because phantom source nodes
generated by PUSBRF are more diverse geographically than which are
generated by PhR[PRLA].
Make the value of random directional hops as h=15, the trend of the
security period and the distance from the source node to the base
station shows that: ① With the increasing of the hop count
between the source node and the base station, the security period of
PhR and PUSBRF also increases. This is because when the hop count is
larger, the more hops that source attackers need to trace back to the
real source node. ② When the hop count between the source node
and the base station of two protocols are the same, the safety
performance of PUSBRF is better than PhR's, indicating that the
safety performance of PUSBRF better than PhR, the reason is the same
as above.
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The performance comparison of above two protocols and LPSS used with
fake packets shows that: the safety performance of pure LPSS is
between PhR and PUSBRF, so are communication overhead and
transmission delay, when LPSS is used with the false packet strategy,
the safety time increased substantially and the communication
overhead becomes larger, but the transmission delay is still close to
pure LPSS protocol, which is because the transmission paths of true
packets are the same with pure LPSS, fake packets just used to
confuse attackers, and don't affect the transmission of true packets.
In summary, compared to the pure flooding and single- path routing,
PhR can resist the attacker's packet tracing attack to some extent,
but the phantom source nodes generated by PhR concentrate in one area
with high probability; PUSBRF protocol makes up this deficiency, it
can generate phantom source nodes which are geographical diversity
with equal probability, and enhance the security of the source node's
location privacy effectively, however the improvement of security
period at the cost of increasing of communication overhead, so the
communication overhead of PUSBRF is more than PhR's, the transmission
delay is longer too, and can't weigh between the security period and
the communication overhead; gets the weigh between security period
and transmission delay by adjusting the value of the parameters Pi.
When LPSS is used combines with false packet strategy, it can achieve
impressive safety performance, but at the cost of communication
overhead increasing.
The above three protocols can withstand source attackers (including
patient source attackers and cautious source attackers), and are more
resistant to cautious source attackers[SECW], their pros and cons
make we should select the appropriate protocol according to specific
application requirements.
The simulation results of location privacy protocols which can
protect the sink node (base station) are shown as follows:
In order to facilitate the comparison, sink location privacy
protection protocols all use the same simulation configuration: in
the OMNet simulation environment, we distribute 2500 sensor nodes
uniformly in a sensor network, make the average number of neighboring
nodes of each node be 8, and attackers began tracking from the source
node.
(1) At the packet forwarding phase LPR protocol selects the next hop
node from the further list with probability Pf, and get the trend
between the transmission delay and hop count from the source node to
the sink node of pure LPR when Pf is 0.0%, 25%, 37.5%, meanwhile
compare with DEFP. The resulet showa that: ① with the
increasing of distance between the source node and the base station,
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the transmission delay of two protocols both increase. This is
because when the source node is far away from the base station, sink
attackers at the source node need to track more hops to reach the
base station;② when the distance from the source node to the
base station are the same in LPR, the transmission delay increases
with the increasing of Pf. This is because Pf is the probability
with which we select the next hop from the further list, the larger
of Pf the more likely to choose the next hop from the further list,
which extends the transmission path;③ when the distance between
the source node and the base station are the same, the transmission
delay of LPR is longer than DEFP's.
(2) The trend between security period and Pf of pure LPR protocol and
compare with DEFP shows that: ① with the increasing of Pf, the
security period of LPR increases. This is because Pf is the
probability with which we select the next hop from the further list,
the larger of Pf the more likely to choose the next hop from the
further list, which extends the transmission path, so sink attackers
need trace a longer time to reach the base station;② the
security period of LPR is longer than DEFP's, and the larger of Pf,
the higher amplitude of LPR's security period longer than DEFP's.
The performance comparison of above two protocols with fake packets
strategy, pure LPSS and LPSS with fake packets strategy indicates
that: when DEFP, LPR, LPSS all used with fake packets strategy, the
security period of three protocols all improving, the transmission
delay remain constant, but the energy consumption increasing.
In summary, LPR can get the balance between privacy protection
strength (security period) and energy consumption by adjusting Pf,
LPR with fake packets strategy can effectively improve the safety
performance of the program compared with DEFP, but its transmission
delay and communication overhead are far greater than DEFP's, LPSS
get the trade-off between transmission delay and security period by
adjusting Pi, and with the increasing of hop counts between the
source node and the sink node, the safety strength (security
period)of LPSS increases evidently dramatically than LPR, but LPSS
can only play full advantage when it is used with fake packets
strategy, otherwise it isn't superior than LPR and DEFP
comprehensively.
The above three protocols can resist sink attackers (including of
patience sink attackers and cautious sink attackers), and they all
have their pros and cons, we need select the appropriate protocol
according to specific application requirements.
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5. Security Consideration
This paper divides attackers into two types based on the properties
of the objects which need be protected: source attackers and sink
attackers, then establishes corresponding attack models, after that
we propose appropriate protocol in accordance with attack models,
including phantom routing (PhR), source location privacy preservation
protocol in wireless sensor networks using source-based restricted
flooding (PUSBRF), location-privacy routing protocol (LPR), location
privacy support scheme (LPSS), differential enforced fractal
propagation (DEFP). At last we have comprehensive analysis and
comparison of these location privacy protection protocols
systematically, mean while sum up the advantages and disadvantages of
each protocol.
6. IANA Consideration
To be completed.
7. References
[RFC4948] Perring, A., Szewczyk, R., Tygar, D., Wen, V., and D.
Culle, "Spins: security protocols for sensor networks",
May 2007.
[RFC4949] Eschenaur, L. and V. Gligor, "A key-management scheme for
distributed sensor networks", August 2007.
[PhR] Kamat, P., Zhang, Y., Trappe, W., and C. Ozturk,
"Enhancing source location privacy in sensor network
routing", August 2005.
[GROW] Xi, Y., Shi, W., and L. Andersson, "Preserving source
location privacy in monitoring-based wireless sensor
networks", August 2006.
[PRLA] W P, Wang., Chen, L., and Wang. J X, "A source--location
privacy protocol in WSN based on locational angle", August
2008.
[PUSBRF] Juan, C., Binxing, F., and Y. Lihua, "A Source--Location
Privacy Preservation Protocol in Wireless Sensor Networks
Using Source--Based Restricted Flooding", August 2010.
[LPR] Jian, Y. and S. Chen, "Protecting Receiver-Location
privacy in Wireless Sensor networks", August 2007.
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[LPSS] Kang, L., "Protecting location privacy in large--scale
wireless sensor networks", August 2009.
[DEFP] Deng, J., Han, R., and S. Mishra, "Countermeasures against
traffic analysis attacks in wireless sensor networks",
October 2005.
[SECH] Cheng, Z. and W. Heinzelman, "Flooding Strategy for Target
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Authors' Addresses
Lin Zhou
SouthEast University
SouthEast University,Nanjing,210012
Email: 573823136@qq.com
Jie Huang
SouthEast University
SouthEast University,Nanjing,210012
Email: jhuang@seu.edu.cn
Zhou & Huang Expires November 29, 2014 [Page 14]
