rfc3715
Network Working Group B. Aboba
Request for Comments: 3715 W. Dixon
Category: Informational Microsoft
March 2004
IPsec-Network Address Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract
This document describes known incompatibilities between Network
Address Translation (NAT) and IPsec, and describes the requirements
for addressing them. Perhaps the most common use of IPsec is in
providing virtual private networking capabilities. One very popular
use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) is to provide telecommuter
access to the corporate Intranet. Today, NATs are widely deployed in
home gateways, as well as in other locations likely to be used by
telecommuters, such as hotels. The result is that IPsec-NAT
incompatibilities have become a major barrier in the deployment of
IPsec in one of its principal uses.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Known Incompatibilities between NA(P)T and IPsec . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Intrinsic NA(P)T Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. NA(P)T Implementation Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Helper Incompatibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Requirements for IPsec-NAT Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Existing Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. IPsec Tunnel Mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. RSIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. 6to4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9 . Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
Perhaps the most common use of IPsec [RFC2401] is in providing
virtual private networking (VPN) capabilities. One very popular use
of VPNs is to provide telecommuter access to the corporate Intranet.
Today, Network Address Translations (NATs) as described in [RFC3022]
and [RFC2663], are widely deployed in home gateways, as well as in
other locations likely to be used by telecommuters, such as hotels.
The result is that IPsec-NAT incompatibilities have become a major
barrier in the deployment of IPsec in one of its principal uses.
This document describes known incompatibilities between NAT and
IPsec, and describes the requirements for addressing them.
1.1. Requirements Language
In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "optional",
"recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be interpreted as
described in [RFC2119].
Please note that the requirements specified in this document are to
be used in evaluating protocol submissions. As such, the
requirements language refers to capabilities of these protocols; the
protocol documents will specify whether these features are required,
recommended, or optional. For example, requiring that a protocol
support confidentiality is not the same thing as requiring that all
protocol traffic be encrypted.
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A protocol submission is not compliant if it fails to satisfy one or
more of the MUST or MUST NOT requirements for the capabilities that
it implements. A protocol submission that satisfies all the MUST,
MUST NOT, SHOULD, and SHOULD NOT requirements for its capabilities is
said to be "unconditionally compliant"; one that satisfies all the
MUST and MUST NOT requirements, but not all the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT
requirements for its protocols is said to be "conditionally
compliant."
2. Known Incompatibilities between NA(P)T and IPsec
The incompatibilities between NA(P)T and IPsec can be divided into
three categories:
1) Intrinsic NA(P)T issues. These incompatibilities derive directly
from the NA(P)T functionality described in [RFC3022]. These
incompatibilities will therefore be present in any NA(P)T device.
2) NA(P)T implementation weaknesses. These incompatibilities are not
intrinsic to NA(P)T, but are present in many NA(P)T
implementations. Included in this category are problems in
handling inbound or outbound fragments. Since these issues are
not intrinsic to NA(P)T, they can, in principle, be addressed in
future NA(P)T implementations. However, since the implementation
problems appear to be wide spread, they need to be taken into
account in a NA(P)T traversal solution.
3) Helper issues. These incompatibilities are present in NA(P)T
devices which attempt to provide for IPsec NA(P)T traversal.
Ironically, this "helper" functionality creates further
incompatibilities, making an already difficult problem harder to
solve. While IPsec traversal "helper" functionality is not
present in all NA(P)Ts, these features are becoming sufficiently
popular that they also need to be taken into account in a NA(P)T
traversal solution.
2.1. Intrinsic NA(P)T Issues
Incompatibilities that are intrinsic to NA(P)T include:
a) Incompatibility between IPsec AH [RFC2402] and NAT. Since the AH
header incorporates the IP source and destination addresses in the
keyed message integrity check, NAT or reverse NAT devices making
changes to address fields will invalidate the message integrity
check. Since IPsec ESP [RFC2406] does not incorporate the IP
source and destination addresses in its keyed message integrity
check, this issue does not arise for ESP.
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b) Incompatibility between checksums and NAT. TCP and UDP checksums
have a dependency on the IP source and destination addresses
through inclusion of the "pseudo-header" in the calculation. As a
result, where checksums are calculated and checked upon receipt,
they will be invalidated by passage through a NAT or reverse NAT
device.
As a result, IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) will only
pass through a NAT unimpeded if TCP/UDP protocols are not involved
(as in IPsec tunnel mode or IPsec protected GRE), or checksums are
not calculated (as is possible with IPv4 UDP). As described in
[RFC793], TCP checksum calculation and verification is required in
IPv4. UDP/TCP checksum calculation and verification is required
in IPv6.
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP), as defined in
[RFC2960] and [RFC3309], uses a CRC32C algorithm calculated only
on the SCTP packet (common header + chunks), so that the IP header
is not covered. As a result, NATs do not invalidate the SCTP CRC,
and the problem does not arise.
Note that since transport mode IPsec traffic is integrity
protected and authenticated using strong cryptography,
modifications to the packet can be detected prior to checking
UDP/TCP checksums. Thus, checksum verification only provides
assurance against errors made in internal processing.
c) Incompatibility between IKE address identifiers and NAT. Where IP
addresses are used as identifiers in Internet Key Exchange
Protocol (IKE) Phase 1 [RFC2409] or Phase 2, modification of the
IP source or destination addresses by NATs or reverse NATs will
result in a mismatch between the identifiers and the addresses in
the IP header. As described in [RFC2409], IKE implementations are
required to discard such packets.
In order to avoid use of IP addresses as IKE Phase 1 and Phase 2
identifiers, userIDs and FQDNs can be used instead. Where user
authentication is desired, an ID type of ID_USER_FQDN can be used,
as described in [RFC2407]. Where machine authentication is
desired, an ID type of ID_FQDN can be used. In either case, it is
necessary to verify that the proposed identifier is authenticated
as a result of processing an end-entity certificate, if
certificates are exchanged in Phase 1. While use of USER_FQDN or
FQDN identity types is possible within IKE, there are usage
scenarios (e.g. Security Policy Database (SPD) entries describing
subnets) that cannot be accommodated this way.
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Since the source address in the Phase 2 identifier is often used
to form a full 5-tuple inbound SA selector, the destination
address, protocol, source port and destination port can be used in
the selector so as not to weaken inbound SA processing.
d) Incompatibility between fixed IKE source ports and NAPT. Where
multiple hosts behind the NAPT initiate IKE SAs to the same
responder, a mechanism is needed to allow the NAPT to demultiplex
the incoming IKE packets from the responder. This is typically
accomplished by translating the IKE UDP source port on outbound
packets from the initiator. Thus responders must be able to
accept IKE traffic from a UDP source port other than 500, and must
reply to that port. Care must be taken to avoid unpredictable
behavior during re-keys. If the floated source port is not used
as the destination port for the re-key, the NAT may not be able to
send the re-key packets to the correct destination.
e) Incompatibilities between overlapping SPD entries and NAT. Where
initiating hosts behind a NAT use their source IP addresses in
Phase 2 identifiers, they can negotiate overlapping SPD entries
with the same responder IP address. The responder could then send
packets down the wrong IPsec SA. This occurs because to the
responder, the IPsec SAs appear to be equivalent, since they exist
between the same endpoints and can be used to pass the same
traffic.
f) Incompatibilities between IPsec SPI selection and NAT. Since
IPsec ESP traffic is encrypted and thus opaque to the NAT, the NAT
must use elements of the IP and IPsec header to demultiplex
incoming IPsec traffic. The combination of the destination IP
address, security protocol (AH/ESP), and IPsec SPI is typically
used for this purpose.
However, since the outgoing and incoming SPIs are chosen
independently, there is no way for the NAT to determine what
incoming SPI corresponds to what destination host merely by
inspecting outgoing traffic. Thus, were two hosts behind the NAT
to attempt to create IPsec SAs at the same destination
simultaneously, it is possible that the NAT will deliver the
incoming IPsec packets to the wrong destination.
Note that this is not an incompatibility with IPsec per se, but
rather with the way it is typically implemented. With both AH and
ESP, the receiving host specifies the SPI to use for a given SA, a
choice which is significant only to the receiver. At present, the
combination of Destination IP, SPI, and Security Protocol (AH,
ESP) uniquely identifies a Security Association. Also, SPI values
in the range 1-255 are reserved to IANA and may be used in the
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future. This means that, when negotiating with the same external
host or gateway, the internal hosts behind the same NAPT can
select the same SPI value, such that one host inbound SA is
(SPI=470, Internal Dest IP=192.168.0.4)
and a different host inbound SA is
(SPI=470, Internal Dest IP=192.168.0.5).
The receiving NAPT will not be able to determine which internal
host an inbound IPsec packet with SPI=470 should be forwarded to.
It is also possible for the receiving host to allocate a unique
SPI to each unicast Security Association. In this case, the
Destination IP Address need only be checked to see if it is "any
valid unicast IP for this host", not checked to see if it is the
specific Destination IP address used by the sending host. Using
this technique, the NA(P)T can be assured of a low but non-zero
chance of forwarding packets to the wrong internal host, even when
two or more hosts establish SAs with the same external host.
This approach is completely backwards compatible, and only
requires the particular receiving host to make a change to its SPI
allocation and IPsec_esp_input() code. However, NA(P)T devices
may not be able to detect this behavior without problems
associated with parsing IKE payloads. And a host may still be
required to use a SPI in the IANA reserved range for the assigned
purpose.
g) Incompatibilities between embedded IP addresses and NAT. Since
the payload is integrity protected, any IP addresses enclosed
within IPsec packets will not be translatable by a NAT. This
renders ineffective Application Layer Gateways (ALGs) implemented
within NATs. Protocols that utilize embedded IP addresses include
FTP, IRC, SNMP, LDAP, H.323, SIP, SCTP (optionally), and many
games. To address this issue, it is necessary to install ALGs on
the host or security gateway that can operate on application
traffic prior to IPsec encapsulation and after IPsec
decapsulation.
h) Implicit directionality of NA(P)T. NA(P)Ts often require an
initial outbound packet to flow through them in order to create an
inbound mapping state. Directionality prohibits unsolicited
establishment of IPsec SAs to hosts behind the NA(P)T.
i) Inbound SA selector verification. Assuming IKE negotiates phase 2
selectors, inbound SA processing will drop the decapsulated
packet, since [RFC2401] requires a packet's source address match
the SA selector value, which NA(P)T processing of an ESP packet
would change.
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2.2. NA(P)T Implementation Weaknesses
Implementation problems present in many NA(P)Ts include:
j) Inability to handle non-UDP/TCP traffic. Some NA(P)Ts discard
non-UDP/TCP traffic or perform address-only translation when only
one host is behind the NAT. Such NAPTs are unable to enable SCTP,
ESP (protocol 50), or AH (protocol 51) traffic.
k) NAT mapping timeouts. NA(P)Ts vary in the time for which a UDP
mapping will be maintained in the absence of traffic. Thus, even
where IKE packets can be correctly translated, the translation
state may be removed prematurely.
l) Inability to handle outgoing fragments. Most NA(P)Ts can properly
fragment outgoing IP packets in the case where the IP packet size
exceeds the MTU on the outgoing interface. However, proper
translation of outgoing packets that are already fragmented is
difficult and most NAPTs do not handle this correctly. As noted
in Section 6.3 of [RFC3022], where two hosts originate fragmented
packets to the same destination, the fragment identifiers can
overlap. Since the destination host relies on the fragmentation
identifier and fragment offset for reassembly, the result will be
data corruption. Few NA(P)Ts protect against identifier
collisions by supporting identifier translation. Identifier
collisions are not an issue when NATs perform the fragmentation,
since the fragment identifier need only be unique within a
source/destination IP address pair.
Since a fragment can be as small as 68 octets [RFC791], there is
no guarantee that the first fragment will contain a complete TCP
header. Thus, a NA(P)T looking to recalculate the TCP checksum
may need to modify a subsequent fragment. Since fragments can be
reordered, and IP addresses can be embedded and possibly even
split between fragments, the NA(P)T will need to perform
reassembly prior to completing the translation. Few NA(P)Ts
support this.
m) Inability to handle incoming fragments. Since only the first
fragment will typically contain a complete IP/UDP/SCTP/TCP header,
NAPTs need to be able to perform the translation based on the
source/dest IP address and fragment identifier alone. Since
fragments can be reordered, the headers to a given fragment
identifier may not be known if a subsequent fragment arrives prior
to the initial one, and the headers may be split between
fragments. As a result, the NAPT may need to perform reassembly
prior to completing the translation. Few NAPTs support this.
Note that with NAT, the source/dest IP address is enough to
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determine the translation so that this does not arise. However,
it is possible for the IPsec or IKE headers to be split between
fragments, so that reassembly may still be required.
2.3. Helper Incompatibilities
Incompatibilities between IPsec and NAT "helper" functionality
include:
n) Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
header inspection. Today some NAT implementations attempt to use
IKE cookies to de-multiplex incoming IKE traffic. As with
source-port de-multiplexing, IKE cookie de-multiplexing results in
problems with re-keying, since Phase 1 re-keys typically will not
use the same cookies as the earlier traffic.
o) Special treatment of port 500. Since some IKE implementations are
unable to handle non-500 UDP source ports, some NATs do not
translate packets with a UDP source port of 500. This means that
these NATs are limited to one IPsec client per destination
gateway, unless they inspect details of the ISAKMP header to
examine cookies which creates the problem noted above.
p) ISAKMP payload inspection. NA(P)T implementations that attempt to
parse ISAKMP payloads may not handle all payload ordering
combinations, or support vendor_id payloads for IKE option
negotiation.
3. Requirements for IPsec-NAT Compatibility
The goal of an IPsec-NAT compatibility solution is to expand the
range of usable IPsec functionality beyond that available in the
NAT-compatible IPsec tunnel mode solution described in Section 2.3.
In evaluating a solution to IPsec-NAT incompatibility, the following
criteria should be kept in mind:
Deployment
Since IPv6 will address the address scarcity issues that
frequently lead to use of NA(P)Ts with IPv4, the IPsec-NAT
compatibility issue is a transitional problem that needs to be
solved in the time frame prior to widespread deployment of IPv6.
Therefore, to be useful, an IPsec-NAT compatibility solution MUST
be deployable on a shorter time scale than IPv6.
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Since IPv6 deployment requires changes to routers as well as
hosts, a potential IPsec-NAT compatibility solution, which
requires changes to both routers and hosts, will be deployable on
approximately the same time scale as IPv6. Thus, an IPsec-NAT
compatibility solution SHOULD require changes only to hosts, and
not to routers.
Among other things, this implies that communication between the
host and the NA(P)T SHOULD NOT be required by an IPsec-NAT
compatibility solution, since that would require changes to the
NA(P)Ts, and interoperability testing between the host and NA(P)T
implementations. In order to enable deployment in the short term,
it is necessary for the solution to work with existing router and
NA(P)T products within the deployed infrastructure.
Protocol Compatibility
An IPsec NAT traversal solution is not expected to resolve issues
with protocols that cannot traverse NA(P)T when unsecured with
IPsec. Therefore, ALGs may still be needed for some protocols,
even when an IPsec NAT traversal solution is available.
Security
Since NA(P)T directionality serves a security function, IPsec
NA(P)T traversal solutions should not allow arbitrary incoming
IPsec or IKE traffic from any IP address to be received by a host
behind the NA(P)T, although mapping state should be maintained
once bidirectional IKE and IPsec communication is established.
Telecommuter Scenario
Since one of the primary uses of IPsec is remote access to
corporate Intranets, a NA(P)T traversal solution MUST support
NA(P)T traversal, via either IPsec tunnel mode or L2TP over IPsec
transport mode [RFC3193]. This includes support for traversal of
more than one NA(P)T between the remote client and the VPN
gateway.
The client may have a routable address and the VPN gateway may be
behind at least one NA(P)T, or alternatively, both the client and
the VPN gateway may be behind one or more NA(P)Ts. Telecommuters
may use the same private IP address, each behind their own NA(P)T,
or many telecommuters may reside on a private network behind the
same NA(P)T, each with their own unique private address,
connecting to the same VPN gateway. Since IKE uses UDP port 500
as the destination, it is not necessary to enable multiple VPN
gateways operating behind the same external IP address.
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Gateway-to-Gateway Scenario
In a gateway-gateway scenario, a privately addressed network (DMZ)
may be inserted between the corporate network and the Internet.
In this design, IPsec security gateways connecting portions of the
corporate network may be resident in the DMZ and have private
addresses on their external (DMZ) interfaces. A NA(P)T connects
the DMZ network to the Internet.
End-to-End Scenario
A NAT-IPsec solution MUST enable secure host-host TCP/IP
communication via IPsec, as well as host-gateway communications.
A host on a private network MUST be able to bring up one or
multiple IPsec-protected TCP connections or UDP sessions to
another host with one or more NA(P)Ts between them. For example,
NA(P)Ts may be deployed within branch offices connecting to the
corporate network, with an additional NA(P)T connecting the
corporate network to the Internet. Likewise, NA(P)Ts may be
deployed within a corporate network LAN or WAN to connect wireless
or remote location clients to the corporate network. This may
require special processing of TCP and UDP traffic on the host.
Bringing up SCTP connections to another host with one or more NA(P)Ts
between them may present special challenges. SCTP supports multi-
homing. If more than one IP address is used, these addresses are
transported as part of the SCTP packet during the association setup
(in the INIT and INIT-ACK chunks). If only single homed SCTP end-
points are used, [RFC2960] section 3.3.2.1 states:
Note that not using any IP address parameters in the INIT and
INIT-ACK is an alternative to make an association more likely
to work across a NAT box.
This implies that IP addresses should not be put into the SCTP packet
unless necessary. If NATs are present and IP addresses are included,
then association setup will fail. Recently [AddIP] has been proposed
which allows the modification of the IP address once an association
is established. The modification messages have also IP addresses in
the SCTP packet, and so will be adversely affected by NATs.
Firewall Compatibility
Since firewalls are widely deployed, a NAT-IPsec compatibility
solution MUST enable a firewall administrator to create simple,
static access rule(s) to permit or deny IKE and IPsec NA(P)T
traversal traffic. This implies, for example, that dynamic
allocation of IKE or IPsec destination ports is to be avoided.
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Scaling
An IPsec-NAT compatibility solution should be capable of being
deployed within an installation consisting of thousands of
telecommuters. In this situation, it is not possible to assume
that only a single host is communicating with a given destination
at a time. Thus, an IPsec-NAT compatibility solution MUST address
the issue of overlapping SPD entries and de-multiplexing of
incoming packets.
Mode Support
At a minimum, an IPsec-NAT compatibility solution MUST support
traversal of the IKE and IPsec modes required for support within
[RFC2409] and [RFC2401]. For example, an IPsec gateway MUST
support ESP tunnel mode NA(P)T traversal, and an IPsec host MUST
support IPsec transport mode NA(P)T traversal. The purpose of AH
is to protect immutable fields within the IP header (including
addresses), and NA(P)T translates addresses, invalidating the AH
integrity check. As a result, NA(P)T and AH are fundamentally
incompatible and there is no requirement that an IPsec-NAT
compatibility solution support AH transport or tunnel mode.
Backward Compatibility and Interoperability
An IPsec-NAT compatibility solution MUST be interoperable with
existing IKE/IPsec implementations, so that they can communicate
where no NA(P)T is present. This implies that an IPsec-NAT
compatibility solution MUST be backwards-compatible with IPsec as
defined in [RFC2401] and IKE as defined in [RFC2409]. In
addition, it SHOULD be able to detect the presence of a NA(P)T, so
that NA(P)T traversal support is only used when necessary. This
implies that it MUST be possible to determine that an existing IKE
implementation does not support NA(P)T traversal, so that a
standard IKE conversation can occur, as described in [RFC2407],
[RFC2408], and [RFC2409]. Note that while this implies initiation
of IKE to port 500, there is no requirement for a specific source
port, so that UDP source port 500 may or may not be used.
Security
An IPsec-NAT compatibility solution MUST NOT introduce additional
IKE or IPsec security vulnerabilities. For example, an acceptable
solution must demonstrate that it introduces no new denial of
service or spoofing vulnerabilities. IKE MUST be allowed to re-
key in a bi-directional manner as described in [RFC2408].
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4. Existing Solutions
4.1. IPsec Tunnel Mode
In a limited set of circumstances, it is possible for an IPsec tunnel
mode implementation, such as that described in [DHCP], to traverse
NA(P)T successfully. However, the requirements for successful
traversal are sufficiently limited so that a more general solution is
needed:
1) IPsec ESP. IPsec ESP tunnels do not cover the outer IP header
within the message integrity check, and so will not suffer
Authentication Data invalidation due to address translation.
IPsec tunnels also need not be concerned about checksum
invalidation.
2) No address validation. Most current IPsec tunnel mode
implementations do not perform source address validation so that
incompatibilities between IKE identifiers and source addresses
will not be detected. This introduces security vulnerabilities as
described in Section 5.
3) "Any to Any" SPD entries. IPsec tunnel mode clients can negotiate
"any to any" SPDs, which are not invalidated by address
translation. This effectively precludes use of SPDs for the
filtering of allowed tunnel traffic.
4) Single client operation. With only a single client behind a NAT,
there is no risk of overlapping SPDs. Since the NAT will not need
to arbitrate between competing clients, there is also no risk of
re-key mis-translation, or improper incoming SPI or cookie
de-multiplexing.
5) No fragmentation. When certificate authentication is used, IKE
fragmentation can be encountered. This can occur when certificate
chains are used, or even when exchanging a single certificate if
the key size, or the size of other certificate fields (such as the
distinguished name and other extensions), is large enough.
However, when pre-shared keys are used for authentication,
fragmentation is less likely.
6) Active sessions. Most VPN sessions typically maintain ongoing
traffic flow during their lifetime so that UDP port mappings are
less likely be removed due to inactivity.
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4.2. RSIP
RSIP, described in [RSIP] and [RSIPFrame], includes mechanisms for
IPsec traversal, as described in [RSIPsec]. By enabling host-NA(P)T
communication, RSIP addresses issues of IPsec SPI de-multiplexing, as
well as SPD overlap. It is thus suitable for use in enterprises, as
well as home networking scenarios. By enabling hosts behind a NAT to
share the external IP address of the NA(P)T (the RSIP gateway), this
approach is compatible with protocols including embedded IP
addresses.
By tunneling IKE and IPsec packets, RSIP avoids changes to the IKE
and IPsec protocols, although major changes are required to host IKE
and IPsec implementations to retrofit them for RSIP-compatibility.
It is thus compatible with all existing protocols (AH/ESP) and modes
(transport and tunnel).
In order to handle de-multiplexing of IKE re-keys, RSIP requires
floating of the IKE source port, as well as re-keying to the floated
port. As a result, interoperability with existing IPsec
implementations is not assured.
RSIP does not satisfy the deployment requirements for an IPsec-NAT
compatibility solution because an RSIP-enabled host requires a
corresponding RSIP-enabled gateway in order to establish an IPsec SA
with another host. Since RSIP requires changes only to clients and
routers and not to servers, it is less difficult to deploy than IPv6.
However, for vendors, implementation of RSIP requires a substantial
fraction of the resources required for IPv6 support. Thus, RSIP
solves a "transitional" problem on a long-term time scale, which is
not useful.
4.3. 6to4
6to4, as described in [RFC3056] can form the basis for an IPsec-NAT
traversal solution. In this approach, the NAT provides IPv6 hosts
with an IPv6 prefix derived from the NAT external IPv4 address, and
encapsulates IPv6 packets in IPv4 for transmission to other 6to4
hosts or 6to4 relays. This enables an IPv6 host using IPsec to
communicate freely to other hosts within the IPv6 or 6to4 clouds.
While 6to4 is an elegant and robust solution where a single NA(P)T
separates a client and VPN gateway, it is not universally applicable.
Since 6to4 requires the assignment of a routable IPv4 address to the
NA(P)T in order to allow formation of an IPv6 prefix, it is not
usable where multiple NA(P)Ts exist between the client and VPN
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gateway. For example, an NA(P)T with a private address on its
external interface cannot be used by clients behind it to obtain an
IPv6 prefix via 6to4.
While 6to4 requires little additional support from hosts that already
support IPv6, it does require changes to NATs, which need to be
upgraded to support 6to4. As a result, 6to4 may not be suitable for
deployment in the short term.
5. Security Considerations
By definition, IPsec-NAT compatibility requires that hosts and
routers implementing IPsec be capable of securely processing packets
whose IP headers are not cryptographically protected. A number of
issues arise from this that are worth discussing.
Since IPsec AH cannot pass through a NAT, one of the side effects of
providing an IPsec-NAT compatibility solution may be for IPsec ESP
with null encryption to be used in place of AH where a NAT exists
between the source and destination. However, it should be noted that
ESP with null encryption does not provide the same security
properties as AH. For example, there are security risks relating to
IPv6 source routing that are precluded by AH, but not by ESP with
null encryption.
In addition, since ESP with any transform does not protect against
source address spoofing, some sort of source IP address sanity
checking needs to be performed. The importance of the anti-spoofing
check is not widely understood. There is normally an anti-spoofing
check on the Source IP Address as part of IPsec_{esp,ah}_input().
This ensures that the packet originates from the same address as that
claimed within the original IKE Phase 1 and Phase 2 security
associations. When a receiving host is behind a NAT, this check
might not strictly be meaningful for unicast sessions, whereas in the
Global Internet this check is important for tunnel-mode unicast
sessions to prevent a spoofing attack described in [AuthSource],
which can occur when access controls on the receiver depend upon the
source IP address of verified ESP packets after decapsulation.
IPsec-NAT compatibility schemes should provide anti-spoofing
protection if it uses source addresses for access controls.
Let us consider two hosts, A and C, both behind (different) NATs, who
negotiate IPsec tunnel mode SAs to router B. Hosts A and C may have
different privileges; for example, host A might belong to an employee
trusted to access much of the corporate Intranet, while C might be a
contractor only authorized to access a specific web site.
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If host C sends a tunnel mode packet spoofing A's IP address as the
source, it is important that this packet not be accorded the
privileges corresponding to A. If authentication and integrity
checking is performed, but no anti-spoofing check (verifying that the
originating IP address corresponds to the SPI) then host C may be
allowed to reach parts of the network that are off limits. As a
result, an IPsec-NAT compatibility scheme MUST provide some degree of
anti-spoofing protection.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
September 1981.
[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC
793, September 1981.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2401] Atkinson, R. and S. Kent, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[RFC2402] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
RFC 2402, November 1998.
[RFC2406] Kent,S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[RFC2407] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
Interpretation for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[RFC2409] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
[RFC2663] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdredge, "IP Network Address
Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations", RFC
2663, August 1999.
[RFC3022] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, January
2001.
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6.2. Informative References
[RFC2408] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M. and J. Turner,
"Internet Security Association and Key Management
Protocol (ISAKMP)", RFC 2408, November 1998.
[RFC2960] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C.,
Schwarzbauer, H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M.,
Zhang, M. and V. Paxson, "Stream Control Transmission
Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000.
[RFC3056] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.
[RFC3193] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Dixon, W., Zorn, G. and S. Booth,
"Securing L2TP using IPsec", RFC 3193, November 2001.
[RFC3309] Stone, J., Stewart, R. and D. Otis, "Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change", RFC 3309,
September 2002.
[RSIPFrame] Borella, M., Lo, J., Grabelsky, D. and G. Montenegro,
"Realm Specific IP: Framework", RFC 3102, October 2001.
[RSIP] Borella, M., Grabelsky, D., Lo, J. and K. Taniguchi,
"Realm Specific IP: Protocol Specification", RFC 3103,
October 2001.
[RSIPsec] Montenegro, G. and M. Borella, "RSIP Support for End-
to-End IPsec", RFC 3104, October 2001.
[DHCP] Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S. and V. Gupta, "Dynamic
Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of
IPsec Tunnel Mode", RFC 3456, January 2003.
[AuthSource] Kent, S., "Authenticated Source Addresses", IPsec WG
Archive (ftp://ftp.ans.net/pub/archive/IPsec), Message-
Id: <v02130517ad121773c8ed@[128.89.0.110]>, January 5,
1996.
[AddIP] Stewart, R., et al., "Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) Dynamic Address Reconfiguration", Work
in Progress.
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7. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Steve Bellovin of AT&T Research, Michael Tuexen of Siemens,
Peter Ford of Microsoft, Ran Atkinson of Extreme Networks, and Daniel
Senie for useful discussions of this problem space.
8. Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: +1 425 706 6605
Fax: +1 425 936 7329
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
William Dixon
V6 Security, Inc.
601 Union Square, Suite #4200-300
Seattle, WA 98101
EMail: ietf-wd@v6security.com
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9. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Intellectual Property
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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Acknowledgement
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Internet Society.
Aboba & Dixon Informational [Page 18]
ERRATA
