rfc9148
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. van der Stok
Request for Comments: 9148 Consultant
Category: Standards Track P. Kampanakis
ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco Systems
M. Richardson
SSW
S. Raza
RISE Research Institutes of Sweden
April 2022
EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with the Secure Constrained
Application Protocol
Abstract
Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate
provisioning protocol over HTTPS. Low-resource devices often use the
lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message
exchanges. This document defines how to transport EST payloads over
secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows constrained devices to use
existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9148.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
3. DTLS and Conformance to RFC 7925 Profiles
4. Protocol Design
4.1. Discovery and URIs
4.2. Mandatory/Optional EST Functions
4.3. Payload Formats
4.4. Message Bindings
4.5. CoAP Response Codes
4.6. Message Fragmentation
4.7. Delayed Responses
4.8. Server-Side Key Generation
5. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar
6. Parameters
7. Deployment Limitations
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Content-Formats Registry
8.2. Resource Type Registry
8.3. Well-Known URIs Registry
9. Security Considerations
9.1. EST Server Considerations
9.2. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar Considerations
10. References
10.1. Normative References
10.2. Informative References
Appendix A. EST Messages to EST-coaps
A.1. cacerts
A.2. enroll / reenroll
A.3. serverkeygen
A.4. csrattrs
Appendix B. EST-coaps Block Message Examples
B.1. cacerts
B.2. enroll / reenroll
Appendix C. Message Content Breakdown
C.1. cacerts
C.2. enroll / reenroll
C.3. serverkeygen
Acknowledgements
Contributors
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
"Classical" Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] is used
for authenticated/authorized endpoint certificate enrollment (and
optionally key provisioning) through a Certification Authority (CA)
or Registration Authority (RA). EST transports messages over HTTPS.
This document defines a new transport for EST based on the
Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) since some Internet of Things
(IoT) devices use CoAP instead of HTTP. Therefore, this
specification utilizes DTLS [RFC6347] and CoAP [RFC7252] instead of
TLS [RFC8446] and HTTP [RFC7230].
EST responses can be relatively large, and for this reason, this
specification also uses CoAP Block-Wise Transfer [RFC7959] to offer a
fragmentation mechanism of EST messages at the CoAP layer.
This document also profiles the use of EST to support certificate-
based client authentication only. Neither HTTP Basic nor Digest
authentication (as described in Section 3.2.3 of [RFC7030]) is
supported.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Many of the concepts in this document are taken from [RFC7030].
Consequently, much text is directly traceable to [RFC7030].
3. DTLS and Conformance to RFC 7925 Profiles
This section describes how EST-coaps conforms to the profiles of low-
resource devices described in [RFC7925]. EST-coaps can transport
certificates and private keys. Certificates are responses to
(re-)enrollment requests or requests for a trusted certificate list.
Private keys can be transported as responses to a server-side key
generation request as described in Section 4.4 of [RFC7030] (and
subsections) and discussed in Section 4.8 of this document.
EST-coaps depends on a secure transport mechanism that secures the
exchanged CoAP messages. DTLS is one such secure protocol. No other
changes are necessary regarding the secure transport of EST messages.
+------------------------------------------------+
| EST request/response messages |
+------------------------------------------------+
| CoAP for message transfer and signaling |
+------------------------------------------------+
| Secure Transport |
+------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: EST-coaps Protocol Layers
In accordance with Sections 3.3 and 4.4 of [RFC7925], the mandatory
cipher suite for DTLS in EST-coaps is
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC7251]. Curve secp256r1 MUST
be supported [RFC8422]; this curve is equivalent to the NIST P-256
curve. After the publication of [RFC7748], support for Curve25519
will likely be required in the future by (D)TLS profiles for the
Internet of Things [RFC7925].
DTLS 1.2 implementations must use the Supported Elliptic Curves and
Supported Point Formats Extensions in [RFC8422]. Uncompressed point
format must also be supported. DTLS 1.3 [RFC9147] implementations
differ from DTLS 1.2 because they do not support point format
negotiation in favor of a single point format for each curve. Thus,
support for DTLS 1.3 does not mandate point format extensions and
negotiation. In addition, in DTLS 1.3, the Supported Elliptic Curves
extension has been renamed to Supported Groups.
CoAP was designed to avoid IP fragmentation. DTLS is used to secure
CoAP messages. However, fragmentation is still possible at the DTLS
layer during the DTLS handshake even when using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) cipher suites. If fragmentation is necessary,
"DTLS provides a mechanism for fragmenting a handshake message over a
number of records, each of which can be transmitted separately, thus
avoiding IP fragmentation" [RFC6347].
The authentication of the EST-coaps server by the EST-coaps client is
based on certificate authentication in the DTLS handshake. The EST-
coaps client MUST be configured with at least an Implicit Trust
Anchor database, which will enable the authentication of the server
the first time before updating its trust anchor (Explicit TA)
[RFC7030].
The authentication of the EST-coaps client MUST be with a client
certificate in the DTLS handshake. This can either be:
* A previously issued client certificate (e.g., an existing
certificate issued by the EST CA); this could be a common case for
simple re-enrollment of clients.
* A previously installed certificate (e.g., manufacturer IDevID
[IEEE802.1AR] or a certificate issued by some other party).
IDevID's are expected to have a very long life, as long as the
device, but under some conditions could expire. In that case, the
server MAY authenticate a client certificate against its trust
store though the certificate is expired (Section 9).
EST-coaps supports the certificate types and TAs that are specified
for EST in Section 3 of [RFC7030].
As described in Section 2.1 of [RFC5272], proof-of-identity refers to
a value that can be used to prove that an end entity or client is in
the possession of and can use the private key corresponding to the
certified public key. Additionally, channel-binding information can
link proof-of-identity with an established connection. Connection-
based proof-of-possession is OPTIONAL for EST-coaps clients and
servers. When proof-of-possession is desired, a set of actions are
required regarding the use of tls-unique, described in Section 3.5 of
[RFC7030]. The tls-unique information consists of the contents of
the first Finished message in the (D)TLS handshake between server and
client [RFC5929]. The client adds the Finished message as a
challengePassword in the attributes section of the PKCS #10
CertificationRequest [RFC5967] to prove that the client is indeed in
control of the private key at the time of the (D)TLS session
establishment. In the case of handshake message fragmentation, if
proof-of-possession is desired, the Finished message added as the
challengePassword in the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is
calculated as specified by (D)TLS. We summarize it here for
convenience. For DTLS 1.2, in the event of handshake message
fragmentation, the hash of the handshake messages used in the Message
Authentication Code (MAC) calculation of the Finished message must be
computed on each reassembled message, as if each message had not been
fragmented (Section 4.2.6 of [RFC6347]). The Finished message is
calculated as shown in Section 7.4.9 of [RFC5246].
For (D)TLS 1.3, Appendix C.5 of [RFC8446] describes the lack of
channel bindings similar to tls-unique. [TLS13-CHANNEL-BINDINGS] can
be used instead to derive a 32-byte tls-exporter binding from the
(D)TLS 1.3 master secret by using a PRF negotiated in the (D)TLS 1.3
handshake, "EXPORTER-Channel-Binding" with no terminating NUL as the
label, the ClientHello.random and ServerHello.random, and a zero-
length context string. When proof-of-possession is desired, the
client adds the tls-exporter value as a challengePassword in the
attributes section of the PKCS #10 CertificationRequest [RFC5967] to
prove that the client is indeed in control of the private key at the
time of the (D)TLS session establishment.
In a constrained CoAP environment, endpoints can't always afford to
establish a DTLS connection for every EST transaction. An EST-coaps
DTLS connection MAY remain open for sequential EST transactions,
which was not the case with [RFC7030]. For example, if a /crts
request is followed by a /sen request, both can use the same
authenticated DTLS connection. However, when a /crts request is
included in the set of sequential EST transactions, some additional
security considerations apply regarding the use of the Implicit and
Explicit TA database as explained in Section 9.1.
Given that after a successful enrollment, it is more likely that a
new EST transaction will not take place for a significant amount of
time, the DTLS connections SHOULD only be kept alive for EST messages
that are relatively close to each other. These could include a /sen
immediately following a /crts when a device is getting bootstrapped.
In some cases, like NAT rebinding, keeping the state of a connection
is not possible when devices sleep for extended periods of time. In
such occasions, [RFC9146] negotiates a connection ID that can
eliminate the need for a new handshake and its additional cost; or,
DTLS session resumption provides a less costly alternative than
redoing a full DTLS handshake.
4. Protocol Design
EST-coaps uses CoAP to transfer EST messages, aided by Block-Wise
Transfer [RFC7959], to avoid IP fragmentation. The use of blocks for
the transfer of larger EST messages is specified in Section 4.6.
Figure 1 shows the layered EST-coaps architecture.
The EST-coaps protocol design follows closely the EST design. The
supported message types in EST-coaps are:
* CA certificate retrieval needed to receive the complete set of CA
certificates.
* Simple enroll and re-enroll for a CA to sign client identity
public keys.
* Certificate Signing Request (CSR) attribute messages that informs
the client of the fields to include in a CSR.
* Server-side key generation messages to provide a client identity
private key when the client chooses so.
While [RFC7030] permits a number of the EST functions to be used
without authentication, this specification requires that the client
MUST be authenticated for all functions.
4.1. Discovery and URIs
EST-coaps is targeted for low-resource networks with small packets.
Two types of installations are possible: (1) a rigid one, where the
address and the supported functions of the EST server(s) are known,
and (2) a flexible one, where the EST server and its supported
functions need to be discovered.
For both types of installations, saving header space is important and
short EST-coaps URIs are specified in this document. These URIs are
shorter than the ones in [RFC7030]. Two example EST-coaps resource
path names are:
coaps://example.com:<port>/.well-known/est/<short-est>
coaps://example.com:<port>/.well-known/est/ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>
The short-est strings are defined in Table 1. Arbitrary Labels are
usually defined and used by EST CAs in order to route client requests
to the appropriate certificate profile. Implementers should consider
using short labels to minimize transmission overhead.
The EST-coaps server URIs, obtained through discovery of the EST-
coaps resource(s) as shown below, are of the form:
coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/<short-est>
coaps://example.com:<port>/<root-resource>/ArbitraryLabel/<short-est>
Figure 5 in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC7030] enumerates the operations and
corresponding paths that are supported by EST. Table 1 provides the
mapping from the EST URI path to the shorter EST-coaps URI path.
+=================+==============================+
| EST | EST-coaps |
+=================+==============================+
| /cacerts | /crts |
+-----------------+------------------------------+
| /simpleenroll | /sen |
+-----------------+------------------------------+
| /simplereenroll | /sren |
+-----------------+------------------------------+
| /serverkeygen | /skg (PKCS #7) |
+-----------------+------------------------------+
| /serverkeygen | /skc (application/pkix-cert) |
+-----------------+------------------------------+
| /csrattrs | /att |
+-----------------+------------------------------+
Table 1: Short EST-coaps URI Path
The /skg message is the EST /serverkeygen equivalent where the client
requests a certificate in PKCS #7 format and a private key. If the
client prefers a single application/pkix-cert certificate instead of
PKCS #7, it will make an /skc request. In both cases (i.e., /skg,
/skc), a private key MUST be returned.
Clients and servers MUST support the short resource EST-coaps URIs.
In the context of CoAP, the presence and location of (path to) the
EST resources are discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-
known/core" including a resource type (RT) parameter with the value
"ace.est*" [RFC6690]. The example below shows the discovery over
CoAPS of the presence and location of EST-coaps resources. Linefeeds
are included only for readability.
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est*
RES: 2.05 Content
</est/crts>;rt="ace.est.crts";ct="281 287",
</est/sen>;rt="ace.est.sen";ct="281 287",
</est/sren>;rt="ace.est.sren";ct="281 287",
</est/att>;rt="ace.est.att";ct=285,
</est/skg>;rt="ace.est.skg";ct=62,
</est/skc>;rt="ace.est.skc";ct=62
The first three lines, describing ace.est.crts, ace.est.sen, and
ace.est.sren, of the discovery response above MUST be returned if the
server supports resource discovery. The last three lines are only
included if the corresponding EST functions are implemented (see
Table 2). The Content-Formats in the response allow the client to
request one that is supported by the server. These are the values
that would be sent in the client request with an Accept Option.
Discoverable port numbers can be returned in the response payload.
An example response payload for non-default CoAPS server port 61617
follows below. Linefeeds are included only for readability.
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est*
RES: 2.05 Content
<coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/crts>;rt="ace.est.crts";
ct="281 287",
<coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/sen>;rt="ace.est.sen";
ct="281 287",
<coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/sren>;rt="ace.est.sren";
ct="281 287",
<coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/att>;rt="ace.est.att";
ct=285,
<coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/skg>;rt="ace.est.skg";
ct=62,
<coaps://[2001:db8:3::123]:61617/est/skc>;rt="ace.est.skc";
ct=62
The server MUST support the default /.well-known/est root resource.
The server SHOULD support resource discovery when it supports non-
default URIs (like /est or /est/ArbitraryLabel) or ports. The client
SHOULD use resource discovery when it is unaware of the available
EST-coaps resources.
Throughout this document, the example root resource of /est is used.
4.2. Mandatory/Optional EST Functions
This specification contains a set of required-to-implement functions,
optional functions, and not-specified functions. The unspecified
functions are deemed too expensive for low-resource devices in
payload and calculation times.
Table 2 specifies the mandatory-to-implement or optional
implementation of the EST-coaps functions. Discovery of the
existence of optional functions is described in Section 4.1.
+=================+==========================+
| EST Functions | EST-coaps Implementation |
+=================+==========================+
| /cacerts | MUST |
+-----------------+--------------------------+
| /simpleenroll | MUST |
+-----------------+--------------------------+
| /simplereenroll | MUST |
+-----------------+--------------------------+
| /fullcmc | Not specified |
+-----------------+--------------------------+
| /serverkeygen | OPTIONAL |
+-----------------+--------------------------+
| /csrattrs | OPTIONAL |
+-----------------+--------------------------+
Table 2: List of EST-coaps Functions
4.3. Payload Formats
EST-coaps is designed for low-resource devices; hence, it does not
need to send Base64-encoded data. Simple binary is more efficient
(30% smaller payload for DER-encoded ASN.1) and well supported by
CoAP. Thus, the payload for a given media type follows the ASN.1
structure of the media type and is transported in binary format.
The Content-Format (HTTP Content-Type equivalent) of the CoAP message
determines which EST message is transported in the CoAP payload. The
media types specified in the HTTP Content-Type header field
(Section 3.2.4 of [RFC7030]) are specified by the Content-Format
Option (12) of CoAP. The combination of URI-Path and Content-Format
in EST-coaps MUST map to an allowed combination of URI and media type
in EST. The required Content-Formats for these requests and response
messages are defined in Section 8.1. The CoAP response codes are
defined in Section 4.5.
Content-Format 287 can be used in place of 281 to carry a single
certificate instead of a PKCS #7 container in a /crts, /sen, /sren,
or /skg response. Content-Format 281 MUST be supported by EST-coaps
servers. Servers MAY also support Content-Format 287. It is up to
the client to support only Content-Format 281, 287 or both. The
client will use a CoAP Accept Option in the request to express the
preferred response Content-Format. If an Accept Option is not
included in the request, the client is not expressing any preference
and the server SHOULD choose format 281.
Content-Format 286 is used in /sen, /sren, and /skg requests and 285
in /att responses.
A representation with Content-Format identifier 62 contains a
collection of representations along with their respective Content-
Format. The Content-Format identifies the media type application/
multipart-core specified in [RFC8710]. For example, a collection,
containing two representations in response to an EST-coaps server-
side key generation /skg request, could include a private key in PKCS
#8 [RFC5958] with Content-Format identifier 284 (0x011C) and a single
certificate in a PKCS #7 container with Content-Format identifier 281
(0x0119). Such a collection would look like
[284,h'0123456789abcdef', 281,h'fedcba9876543210'] in diagnostic
Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) notation. The
serialization of such CBOR content would be:
84 # array(4)
19 011C # unsigned(284)
48 # bytes(8)
0123456789ABCDEF # "\x01#Eg\x89\xAB\xCD\xEF"
19 0119 # unsigned(281)
48 # bytes(8)
FEDCBA9876543210 # "\xFE\xDC\xBA\x98vT2\x10"
Figure 2: Multipart /skg Response Serialization
When the client makes an /skc request, the certificate returned with
the private key is a single X.509 certificate (not a PKCS #7
container) with Content-Format identifier 287 (0x011F) instead of
281. In cases where the private key is encrypted with Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) (as explained in Section 4.8), the Content-
Format identifier is 280 (0x0118) instead of 284. The Content-Format
used in the response is summarized in Table 3.
+==========+==================+==================+
| Function | Response, Part 1 | Response, Part 2 |
+==========+==================+==================+
| /skg | 284 | 281 |
+----------+------------------+------------------+
| /skc | 280 | 287 |
+----------+------------------+------------------+
Table 3: Response Content-Formats for /skg and
/skc
The key and certificate representations are DER-encoded ASN.1, in its
binary form. An example is shown in Appendix A.3.
4.4. Message Bindings
The general EST-coaps message characteristics are:
* EST-coaps servers sometimes need to provide delayed responses,
which are preceded by an immediately returned empty ACK or an ACK
containing response code 5.03 as explained in Section 4.7. Thus,
it is RECOMMENDED for implementers to send EST-coaps requests in
Confirmable (CON) CoAP messages.
* The CoAP Options used are Uri-Host, Uri-Path, Uri-Port, Content-
Format, Block1, Block2, and Accept. These CoAP Options are used
to communicate the HTTP fields specified in the EST REST messages.
The Uri-host and Uri-Port Options can be omitted from the CoAP
message sent on the wire. When omitted, they are logically
assumed to be the transport protocol destination address and port,
respectively. Explicit Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are
typically used when an endpoint hosts multiple virtual servers and
uses the Options to route the requests accordingly. Other CoAP
Options should be handled in accordance with [RFC7252].
* EST URLs are HTTPS based (https://); in CoAP, these are assumed to
be translated to CoAPS (coaps://).
Table 1 provides the mapping from the EST URI path to the EST-coaps
URI path. Appendix A includes some practical examples of EST
messages translated to CoAP.
4.5. CoAP Response Codes
Section 5.9 of [RFC7252] and Section 7 of [RFC8075] specify the
mapping of HTTP response codes to CoAP response codes. The success
code in response to an EST-coaps GET request (/crts, /att) is 2.05.
Similarly, 2.04 is used in successful response to EST-coaps POST
requests (/sen, /sren, /skg, /skc).
EST makes use of HTTP 204 or 404 responses when a resource is not
available for the client. In EST-coaps, 2.04 is used in response to
a POST (/sen, /sren, /skg, /skc). 4.04 is used when the resource is
not available for the client.
HTTP response code 202 with a Retry-After header field in [RFC7030]
has no equivalent in CoAP. HTTP 202 with Retry-After is used in EST
for delayed server responses. Section 4.7 specifies how EST-coaps
handles delayed messages with 5.03 responses with a Max-Age Option.
Additionally, EST's HTTP 400, 401, 403, 404, and 503 status codes
have their equivalent CoAP 4.00, 4.01, 4.03, 4.04, and 5.03 response
codes in EST-coaps. Table 4 summarizes the EST-coaps response codes.
+=============+=========================+==========================+
| Operation | EST-coaps Response Code | Description |
+=============+=========================+==========================+
| /crts, /att | 2.05 | Success. Certs included |
| | | in the response payload. |
+-------------+-------------------------+--------------------------+
| | 4.xx / 5.xx | Failure. |
+-------------+-------------------------+--------------------------+
| /sen, /skg, | 2.04 | Success. Cert included |
| /sren, /skc | | in the response payload. |
+-------------+-------------------------+--------------------------+
| | 5.03 | Retry in Max-Age Option |
| | | time. |
+-------------+-------------------------+--------------------------+
| | 4.xx / 5.xx | Failure. |
+-------------+-------------------------+--------------------------+
Table 4: EST-coaps Response Codes
4.6. Message Fragmentation
DTLS defines fragmentation only for the handshake and not for secure
data exchange (DTLS records). [RFC6347] states that to avoid using
IP fragmentation, which involves error-prone datagram reconstitution,
invokers of the DTLS record layer should size DTLS records so that
they fit within any Path MTU estimates obtained from the record
layer. In addition, invokers residing on 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low-
Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) over IEEE 802.15.4 networks
[IEEE802.15.4] are recommended to size CoAP messages such that each
DTLS record will fit within one or two IEEE 802.15.4 frames.
That is not always possible in EST-coaps. Even though ECC
certificates are small in size, they can vary greatly based on
signature algorithms, key sizes, and Object Identifier (OID) fields
used. For 256-bit curves, common Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) cert sizes are 500-1000 bytes, which could
fluctuate further based on the algorithms, OIDs, Subject Alternative
Names (SANs), and cert fields. For 384-bit curves, ECDSA
certificates increase in size and can sometimes reach 1.5KB.
Additionally, there are times when the EST cacerts response from the
server can include multiple certificates that amount to large
payloads. Section 4.6 of [RFC7252] (CoAP) describes the possible
payload sizes: "if nothing is known about the size of the headers,
good upper bounds are 1152 bytes for the message size and 1024 bytes
for the payload size". Section 4.6 of [RFC7252] also suggests that
IPv4 implementations may want to limit themselves to more
conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as 576 bytes. Even with ECC,
EST-coaps messages can still exceed MTU sizes on the Internet or
6LoWPAN [RFC4919] (Section 2 of [RFC7959]). EST-coaps needs to be
able to fragment messages into multiple DTLS datagrams.
To perform fragmentation in CoAP, [RFC7959] specifies the Block1
Option for fragmentation of the request payload and the Block2 Option
for fragmentation of the return payload of a CoAP flow. As explained
in Section 1 of [RFC7959], block-wise transfers should be used in
Confirmable CoAP messages to avoid the exacerbation of lost blocks.
EST-coaps servers MUST implement Block1 and Block2. EST-coaps
clients MUST implement Block2. EST-coaps clients MUST implement
Block1 only if they are expecting to send EST-coaps requests with a
packet size that exceeds the path MTU.
[RFC7959] also defines Size1 and Size2 Options to provide size
information about the resource representation in a request and
response. The EST-coaps client and server MAY support Size1 and
Size2 Options.
Examples of fragmented EST-coaps messages are shown in Appendix B.
4.7. Delayed Responses
Server responses can sometimes be delayed. According to
Section 5.2.2 of [RFC7252], a slow server can acknowledge the request
and respond later with the requested resource representation. In
particular, a slow server can respond to an EST-coaps enrollment
request with an empty ACK with code 0.00 before sending the
certificate to the client after a short delay. If the certificate
response is large, the server will need more than one Block2 block to
transfer it.
This situation is shown in Figure 3. The client sends an enrollment
request that uses N1+1 Block1 blocks. The server uses an empty 0.00
ACK to announce the delayed response, which is provided later with
2.04 messages containing N2+1 Block2 Options. The first 2.04 is a
Confirmable message that is acknowledged by the client. Onwards, the
client acknowledges all subsequent Block2 blocks. The notation of
Figure 3 is explained in Appendix B.1.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 1)} -->
<-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 2)} -->
<-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
.
.
.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256)
{CSR (frag# N1+1)}-->
<-- (0.00 empty ACK)
|
... Short delay before the certificate is ready ...
|
<-- (CON) (1:N1/0/256)(2:0/1/256)(2.04 Changed)
{Cert resp (frag# 1)}
(ACK) -->
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/256) -->
<-- (ACK) (2:1/1/256) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 2)}
.
.
.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/256) -->
<-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/256) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# N2+1)}
Figure 3: EST-coaps Enrollment with Short Wait
If the server is very slow (for example, manual intervention is
required, which would take minutes), it SHOULD respond with an ACK
containing response code 5.03 (Service unavailable) and a Max-Age
Option to indicate the time the client SHOULD wait before sending
another request to obtain the content. After a delay of Max-Age, the
client SHOULD resend the identical CSR to the server. As long as the
server continues to respond with response code 5.03 (Service
Unavailable) with a Max-Age Option, the client will continue to delay
for Max-Age and then resend the enrollment request until the server
responds with the certificate or the client abandons the request due
to policy or other reasons.
To demonstrate this scenario, Figure 4 shows a client sending an
enrollment request that uses N1+1 Block1 blocks to send the CSR to
the server. The server needs N2+1 Block2 blocks to respond but also
needs to take a long delay (minutes) to provide the response.
Consequently, the server uses a 5.03 ACK response with a Max-Age
Option. The client waits for a period of Max-Age as many times as it
receives the same 5.03 response and retransmits the enrollment
request until it receives a certificate in a fragmented 2.04
response.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 1)} -->
<-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 2)} -->
<-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
.
.
.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256)
{CSR (frag# N1+1)}-->
<-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (5.03 Service Unavailable) (Max-Age)
|
|
... Client tries again after Max-Age with identical payload ...
|
|
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:0/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 1)}-->
<-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 2)} -->
<-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
.
.
.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen(CON)(1:N1/0/256)
{CSR (frag# N1+1)}-->
|
... Immediate response when certificate is ready ...
|
<-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256) (2:0/1/256) (2.04 Changed)
{Cert resp (frag# 1)}
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/256) -->
<-- (ACK) (2:1/1/256) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# 2)}
.
.
.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/256) -->
<-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/256) (2.04 Changed) {Cert resp (frag# N2+1)}
Figure 4: EST-coaps Enrollment with Long Wait
4.8. Server-Side Key Generation
Private keys can be generated on the server to support scenarios
where server-side key generation is needed. Such scenarios include
those where it is considered more secure to generate the long-lived,
random private key that identifies the client at the server, or where
the resources spent to generate a random private key at the client
are considered scarce, or where the security policy requires that the
certificate public and corresponding private keys are centrally
generated and controlled. As always, it is necessary to use proper
random numbers in various protocols such as (D)TLS (Section 9.1).
When requesting server-side key generation, the client asks for the
server or proxy to generate the private key and the certificate,
which are transferred back to the client in the server-side key
generation response. In all respects, the server treats the CSR as
it would treat any enroll or re-enroll CSR; the only distinction here
is that the server MUST ignore the public key values and signature in
the CSR. These are included in the request only to allow reuse of
existing codebases for generating and parsing such requests.
The client /skg request is for a certificate in a PKCS #7 container
and private key in two application/multipart-core elements.
Respectively, an /skc request is for a single application/pkix-cert
certificate and a private key. The private key Content-Format
requested by the client is indicated in the PKCS #10 CSR request. If
the request contains SMIMECapabilities and DecryptKeyIdentifier or
AsymmetricDecryptKeyIdentifier, the client is expecting Content-
Format 280 for the private key. Then, this private key is encrypted
symmetrically or asymmetrically per [RFC7030]. The symmetric key or
the asymmetric keypair establishment method is out of scope of this
specification. An /skg or /skc request with a CSR without
SMIMECapabilities expects an application/multipart-core with an
unencrypted PKCS #8 private key with Content-Format 284.
The EST-coaps server-side key generation response is returned with
Content-Format application/multipart-core [RFC8710] containing a CBOR
array with four items (Section 4.3). The two representations (each
consisting of two CBOR array items) do not have to be in a particular
order since each representation is preceded by its Content-Format ID.
Depending on the request, the private key can be in unprotected PKCS
#8 format [RFC5958] (Content-Format 284) or protected inside of CMS
SignedData (Content-Format 280). The SignedData, placed in the
outermost container, is signed by the party that generated the
private key, which may be the EST server or the EST CA. SignedData
placed within the Enveloped Data does not need additional signing as
explained in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7030]. In summary, the
symmetrically encrypted key is included in the encryptedKey attribute
in a KEKRecipientInfo structure. In the case where the asymmetric
encryption key is suitable for transport key operations, the
generated private key is encrypted with a symmetric key. The
symmetric key itself is encrypted by the client-defined (in the CSR)
asymmetric public key and is carried in an encryptedKey attribute in
a KeyTransRecipientInfo structure. Finally, if the asymmetric
encryption key is suitable for key agreement, the generated private
key is encrypted with a symmetric key. The symmetric key itself is
encrypted by the client defined (in the CSR) asymmetric public key
and is carried in a recipientEncryptedKeys attribute in a
KeyAgreeRecipientInfo.
[RFC7030] recommends the use of additional encryption of the returned
private key. For the context of this specification, clients and
servers that choose to support server-side key generation MUST
support unprotected (PKCS #8) private keys (Content-Format 284).
Symmetric or asymmetric encryption of the private key (CMS
EnvelopedData, Content-Format 280) SHOULD be supported for
deployments where end-to-end encryption is needed between the client
and a server. Such cases could include architectures where an entity
between the client and the CA terminates the DTLS connection
(Registrar in Figure 5). Though [RFC7030] strongly recommends that
clients request the use of CMS encryption on top of the TLS channel's
protection, this document does not make such a recommendation; CMS
encryption can still be used when mandated by the use case.
5. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar
In real-world deployments, the EST server will not always reside
within the CoAP boundary. The EST server can exist outside the
constrained network, in which case it will support TLS/HTTP instead
of CoAPS. In such environments, EST-coaps is used by the client
within the CoAP boundary and TLS is used to transport the EST
messages outside the CoAP boundary. A Registrar at the edge is
required to operate between the CoAP environment and the external
HTTP network as shown in Figure 5.
Constrained Network
.------. .----------------------------.
| CA | |.--------------------------.|
'------' || ||
| || ||
.------. HTTP .------------------. CoAPS .-----------. ||
| EST |<------->|EST-coaps-to-HTTPS|<------->| EST Client| ||
|Server|over TLS | Registrar | '-----------' ||
'------' '------------------' ||
|| ||
|'--------------------------'|
'----------------------------'
Figure 5: EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar at the CoAP Boundary
The EST-coaps-to-HTTPS Registrar MUST terminate EST-coaps downstream
and initiate EST connections over TLS upstream. The Registrar MUST
authenticate and optionally authorize the client requests while it
MUST be authenticated by the EST server or CA. The trust
relationship between the Registrar and the EST server SHOULD be pre-
established for the Registrar to proxy these connections on behalf of
various clients.
When enforcing Proof-of-Possession (POP) linking, the tls-unique or
tls-exporter value of the session for DTLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.3,
respectively, is used to prove that the private key corresponding to
the public key is in the possession of the client and was used to
establish the connection as explained in Section 3. The POP linking
information is lost between the EST-coaps client and the EST server
when a Registrar is present. The EST server becomes aware of the
presence of a Registrar from its TLS client certificate that includes
the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage (EKU) extension [RFC6402]. As
explained in Section 3.7 of [RFC7030], the "EST server SHOULD apply
authorization policy consistent with an RA client ... the EST server
could be configured to accept POP linking information that does not
match the current TLS session because the authenticated EST client RA
has verified this information when acting as an EST server".
Table 1 contains the URI mappings between EST-coaps and EST that the
Registrar MUST adhere to. Section 4.5 of this specification and
Section 7 of [RFC8075] define the mappings between EST-coaps and HTTP
response codes that determine how the Registrar MUST translate CoAP
response codes from/to HTTP status codes. The mapping from CoAP
Content-Format to HTTP Content-Type is defined in Section 8.1.
Additionally, a conversion from CBOR major type 2 to Base64 encoding
MUST take place at the Registrar. If CMS end-to-end encryption is
employed for the private key, the encrypted CMS EnvelopedData blob
MUST be converted at the Registrar to binary CBOR type 2 downstream
to the client. This is a format conversion that does not require
decryption of the CMS EnvelopedData.
A deviation from the mappings in Table 1 could take place if clients
that leverage server-side key generation preferred for the enrolled
keys to be generated by the Registrar in the case the CA does not
support server-side key generation. Such a Registrar is responsible
for generating a new CSR signed by a new key that will be returned to
the client along with the certificate from the CA. In these cases,
the Registrar MUST use random number generation with proper entropy.
Due to fragmentation of large messages into blocks, an EST-coaps-to-
HTTP Registrar MUST reassemble the blocks before translating the
binary content to Base64 and consecutively relay the message
upstream.
The EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar MUST support resource discovery
according to the rules in Section 4.1.
6. Parameters
This section addresses transmission parameters described in Sections
4.7 and 4.8 of [RFC7252]. EST does not impose any unique values on
the CoAP parameters in [RFC7252], but the setting of the CoAP
parameter values may have consequence for the setting of the EST
parameter values.
Implementations should follow the default CoAP configuration
parameters [RFC7252]. However, depending on the implementation
scenario, retransmissions and timeouts can also occur on other
networking layers, governed by other configuration parameters. When
a change in a server parameter has taken place, the parameter values
in the communicating endpoints MUST be adjusted as necessary.
Examples of how parameters could be adjusted include higher-layer
congestion protocols, provisioning agents, and configurations
included in firmware updates.
Some further comments about some specific parameters, mainly from
Table 2 in [RFC7252], include the following:
NSTART: A parameter that controls the number of simultaneous
outstanding interactions that a client maintains to a given
server. An EST-coaps client is expected to control at most one
interaction with a given server, which is the default NSTART value
defined in [RFC7252].
DEFAULT_LEISURE: A setting that is only relevant in multicast
scenarios and is outside the scope of EST-coaps.
PROBING_RATE: A parameter that specifies the rate of resending Non-
confirmable messages. In the rare situations that Non-confirmable
messages are used, the default PROBING_RATE value defined in
[RFC7252] applies.
Finally, the Table 3 parameters in [RFC7252] are mainly derived from
Table 2. Directly changing parameters on one table would affect
parameters on the other.
7. Deployment Limitations
Although EST-coaps paves the way for the utilization of EST by
constrained devices in constrained networks, some classes of devices
[RFC7228] will not have enough resources to handle the payloads that
come with EST-coaps. The specification of EST-coaps is intended to
ensure that EST works for networks of constrained devices that choose
to limit their communications stack to DTLS/CoAP. It is up to the
network designer to decide which devices execute the EST protocol and
which do not.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Content-Formats Registry
IANA has registered the following Content-Formats given in Table 5 in
the "CoAP Content-Formats" subregistry within the "CoRE Parameters"
registry [CORE-PARAMS]. These have been registered in the IETF
Review or IESG Approval range (256-9999).
+=================================+=====+====================+
| Media Type | ID | Reference |
+=================================+=====+====================+
| application/pkcs7-mime; smime- | 280 | [RFC7030] |
| type=server-generated-key | | [RFC8551] RFC 9148 |
+---------------------------------+-----+--------------------+
| application/pkcs7-mime; smime- | 281 | [RFC8551] RFC 9148 |
| type=certs-only | | |
+---------------------------------+-----+--------------------+
| application/pkcs8 | 284 | [RFC5958] |
| | | [RFC8551] RFC 9148 |
+---------------------------------+-----+--------------------+
| application/csrattrs | 285 | [RFC7030] RFC 9148 |
+---------------------------------+-----+--------------------+
| application/pkcs10 | 286 | [RFC5967] |
| | | [RFC8551] RFC 9148 |
+---------------------------------+-----+--------------------+
| application/pkix-cert | 287 | [RFC2585] RFC 9148 |
+---------------------------------+-----+--------------------+
Table 5: New CoAP Content-Formats
8.2. Resource Type Registry
IANA has registered the following Resource Type (rt=) Link Target
Attributes given in Table 6 in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target
Attribute Values" subregistry under the "Constrained RESTful
Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry.
+==============+===================================+===========+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+==============+===================================+===========+
| ace.est.crts | This resource depicts the support | RFC 9148 |
| | of EST GET cacerts. | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
| ace.est.sen | This resource depicts the support | RFC 9148 |
| | of EST simple enroll. | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
| ace.est.sren | This resource depicts the support | RFC 9148 |
| | of EST simple reenroll. | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
| ace.est.att | This resource depicts the support | RFC 9148 |
| | of EST GET CSR attributes. | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
| ace.est.skg | This resource depicts the support | RFC 9148 |
| | of EST server-side key generation | |
| | with the returned certificate in | |
| | a PKCS #7 container. | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
| ace.est.skc | This resource depicts the support | RFC 9148 |
| | of EST server-side key generation | |
| | with the returned certificate in | |
| | application/pkix-cert format. | |
+--------------+-----------------------------------+-----------+
Table 6: New Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attributes
8.3. Well-Known URIs Registry
IANA has added an additional reference to the est URI in the "Well-
Known URIs" registry:
URI Suffix: est
Change Controller: IETF
References: [RFC7030] RFC 9148
Status: permanent
Related Information:
Date Registered: 2013-08-16
Date Modified: 2020-04-29
9. Security Considerations
9.1. EST Server Considerations
The security considerations in Section 6 of [RFC7030] are only
partially valid for the purposes of this document. As HTTP Basic
Authentication is not supported, the considerations expressed for
using passwords do not apply. The other portions of the security
considerations in [RFC7030] continue to apply.
Modern security protocols require random numbers to be available
during the protocol run, for example, for nonces and ephemeral (EC)
Diffie-Hellman key generation. This capability to generate random
numbers is also needed when the constrained device generates the
private key (that corresponds to the public key enrolled in the CSR).
When server-side key generation is used, the constrained device
depends on the server to generate the private key randomly, but it
still needs locally generated random numbers for use in security
protocols, as explained in Section 12 of [RFC7925]. Additionally,
the transport of keys generated at the server is inherently risky.
For those deploying server-side key generation, analysis SHOULD be
done to establish whether server-side key generation increases or
decreases the probability of digital identity theft.
It is important to note that, as pointed out in [PsQs], sources
contributing to the randomness pool used to generate random numbers
on laptops or desktop PCs, such as mouse movement, timing of
keystrokes, or air turbulence on the movement of hard drive heads,
are not available on many constrained devices. Other sources have to
be used or dedicated hardware has to be added. Selecting hardware
for an IoT device that is capable of producing high-quality random
numbers is therefore important [RSA-FACT].
As discussed in Section 6 of [RFC7030], it is
| RECOMMENDED that the Implicit Trust Anchor database used for EST
| server authentication be carefully managed to reduce the chance of
| a third-party CA with poor certification practices from being
| trusted. Disabling the Implicit Trust Anchor database after
| successfully receiving the Distribution of CA certificates
| response ([RFC7030], Section 6) limits any vulnerability to the
| first TLS exchange.
Alternatively, in a case where a /sen request immediately follows a
/crts, a client MAY choose to keep the connection authenticated by
the Implicit TA open for efficiency reasons (Section 3). A client
that interleaves EST-coaps /crts request with other requests in the
same DTLS connection SHOULD revalidate the server certificate chain
against the updated Explicit TA from the /crts response before
proceeding with the subsequent requests. If the server certificate
chain does not authenticate against the database, the client SHOULD
close the connection without completing the rest of the requests.
The updated Explicit TA MUST continue to be used in new DTLS
connections.
In cases where the Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) used to
authenticate the client is expired, the server MAY still authenticate
the client because IDevIDs are expected to live as long as the device
itself (Section 3). In such occasions, checking the certificate
revocation status or authorizing the client using another method is
important for the server to raise its confidence that the client can
be trusted.
In accordance with [RFC7030], TLS cipher suites that include
"_EXPORT_" and "_DES_" in their names MUST NOT be used. More
recommendations for secure use of TLS and DTLS are included in
[BCP195].
As described in Certificate Management over CMS (CMC), Section 6.7 of
[RFC5272], "For keys that can be used as signature keys, signing the
certification request with the private key serves as a POP on that
key pair". In (D)TLS 1.2, the inclusion of tls-unique in the
certificate request links the proof-of-possession to the (D)TLS
proof-of-identity. This implies but does not prove that only the
authenticated client currently has access to the private key.
What's more, CMC POP linking uses tls-unique as it is defined in
[RFC5929]. The 3SHAKE attack [TRIPLESHAKE] poses a risk by allowing
an on-path active attacker to leverage session resumption and
renegotiation to inject itself between a client and server even when
channel binding is in use. Implementers should use the Extended
Master Secret Extension in DTLS [RFC7627] to prevent such attacks.
In the context of this specification, an attacker could invalidate
the purpose of the POP linking challengePassword in the client
request by resuming an EST-coaps connection. Even though the
practical risk of such an attack to EST-coaps is not devastating, we
would rather use a more secure channel-binding mechanism. In this
specification, we still depend on the tls-unique mechanism defined in
[RFC5929] for DTLS 1.2 because a 3SHAKE attack does not expose
messages exchanged with EST-coaps. But for DTLS 1.3,
[TLS13-CHANNEL-BINDINGS] is used instead to derive a 32-byte tls-
exporter binding in place of the tls-unique value in the CSR. That
would alleviate the risks from the 3SHAKE attack [TRIPLESHAKE].
Interpreters of ASN.1 structures should be aware of the use of
invalid ASN.1 length fields and should take appropriate measures to
guard against buffer overflows, stack overruns in particular, and
malicious content in general.
9.2. HTTPS-CoAPS Registrar Considerations
The Registrar proposed in Section 5 must be deployed with care and
only when direct client-server connections are not possible. When
POP linking is used, the Registrar terminating the DTLS connection
establishes a new TLS connection with the upstream CA. Thus, it is
impossible for POP linking to be enforced end to end for the EST
transaction. The EST server could be configured to accept POP
linking information that does not match the current TLS session
because the authenticated EST Registrar is assumed to have verified
POP linking downstream to the client.
The introduction of an EST-coaps-to-HTTP Registrar assumes the client
can authenticate the Registrar using its implicit or explicit TA
database. It also assumes the Registrar has a trust relationship
with the upstream EST server in order to act on behalf of the
clients. When a client uses the Implicit TA database for certificate
validation, it SHOULD confirm if the server is acting as an RA by the
presence of the id-kp-cmcRA EKU [RFC6402] in the server certificate.
In a server-side key generation case, if no end-to-end encryption is
used, the Registrar may be able see the private key as it acts as a
man in the middle. Thus, the client puts its trust on the Registrar
not exposing the private key.
Clients that leverage server-side key generation without end-to-end
encryption of the private key (Section 4.8) have no knowledge as to
whether the Registrar will be generating the private key and
enrolling the certificates with the CA or if the CA will be
responsible for generating the key. In such cases, the existence of
a Registrar requires the client to put its trust on the Registrar
when it is generating the private key.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2585] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
RFC 2585, DOI 10.17487/RFC2585, May 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2585>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.
[RFC5967] Turner, S., "The application/pkcs10 Media Type", RFC 5967,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5967, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5967>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.
[RFC8075] Castellani, A., Loreto, S., Rahman, A., Fossati, T., and
E. Dijk, "Guidelines for Mapping Implementations: HTTP to
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 8075,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8075, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8075>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8551] Schaad, J., Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 4.0
Message Specification", RFC 8551, DOI 10.17487/RFC8551,
April 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8551>.
[RFC8710] Fossati, T., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "Multipart
Content-Format for the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP)", RFC 8710, DOI 10.17487/RFC8710, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8710>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
10.2. Informative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>
[CORE-PARAMS]
IANA, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/>.
[IEEE802.15.4]
IEEE, "IEEE 802.15.4-2020 - IEEE Standard for Low-Rate
Wireless Networks", May 2020.
[IEEE802.1AR]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks - Secure Device Identity", December 2009.
[PKI-GUIDE]
Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson,
"Guide for building an ECC pki", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-10, 31 January
2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-10>.
[PsQs] Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J. Alex
Halderman, "Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread
Weak Keys in Network Devices", USENIX Security Symposium
2012, ISBN 978-931971-95-9, August 2012.
[RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6
over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs):
Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals",
RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4919>.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.
[RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7251] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal, "AES-
CCM Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
TLS", RFC 7251, DOI 10.17487/RFC7251, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7251>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC9146] Rescorla, E., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Fossati, T., and
A. Kraus, "Connection Identifier for DTLS 1.2", RFC 9146,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9146, March 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9146>.
[RSA-FACT] Bernstein, D., Chang, Y., Cheng, C., Chou, L., Heninger,
N., Lange, T., and N. Someren, "Factoring RSA keys from
certified smart cards: Coppersmith in the wild", Advances
in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2013, August 2013.
[TLS13-CHANNEL-BINDINGS]
Whited, S., "Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-
bindings-for-tls13-15, 4 March 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-kitten-
tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-15>.
[TRIPLESHAKE]
Bhargavan, B., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS",
ISBN 978-1-4799-4686-0, DOI 10.1109/SP.2014.14, May 2014,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2014.14>.
Appendix A. EST Messages to EST-coaps
This section shows similar examples to the ones presented in
Appendix A of [RFC7030]. The payloads in the examples are the hex-
encoded binary, generated with 'xxd -p', of the PKI certificates
created following [PKI-GUIDE]. Hex is used for visualization
purposes because a binary representation cannot be rendered well in
text. The hexadecimal representations would not be transported in
hex, but in binary. The payloads are shown unencrypted. In
practice, the message content would be transferred over an encrypted
DTLS channel.
The certificate responses included in the examples contain Content-
Format 281 (application/pkcs7). If the client had requested Content-
Format 287 (application/pkix-cert), the server would respond with a
single DER binary certificate. That certificate would be in a
multipart-core container specifically in the case of a response to a
/est/skc query.
These examples assume a short resource path of "/est". Even though
omitted from the examples for brevity, before making the EST-coaps
requests, a client would learn about the server supported EST-coaps
resources with a GET request for /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est* as
explained in Section 4.1.
The corresponding CoAP headers are only shown in Appendix A.1.
Creating CoAP headers is assumed to be generally understood.
The message content is presented in plain text in Appendix C.
A.1. cacerts
In EST-coaps, a cacerts message can be the following:
GET example.com:9085/est/crts
(Accept: 281)
The corresponding CoAP header fields are shown below. The use of
block and DTLS are shown in Appendix B.
Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x01 (0.01 is GET)
Token = 0x9a (client generated)
Options
Option (Uri-Host)
Option Delta = 0x3 (option# 3)
Option Length = 0xB
Option Value = "example.com"
Option (Uri-Port)
Option Delta = 0x4 (option# 3+4=7)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 9085
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x4 (option# 7+4=11)
Option Length = 0x3
Option Value = "est"
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x0 (option# 11+0=11)
Option Length = 0x4
Option Value = "crts"
Option (Accept)
Option Delta = 0x6 (option# 11+6=17)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 281
Payload = [Empty]
As specified in Section 5.10.1 of [RFC7252], the Uri-Host and Uri-
Port Options can be omitted if they coincide with the transport
protocol destination address and port, respectively.
A 2.05 Content response with a cert in EST-coaps will then be the
following:
2.05 Content (Content-Format: 281)
{payload with certificate in binary format}
With the following CoAP fields:
Ver = 1
T = 2 (ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied from request by server)
Options
Option (Content-Format)
Option Delta = 0xC (option# 12)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 281
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
Payload =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The payload is shown in plain text in Appendix C.1.
A.2. enroll / reenroll
During the (re-)enroll exchange, the EST-coaps client uses a CSR
(Content-Format 286) request in the POST request payload. The Accept
Option tells the server that the client is expecting Content-Format
281 (PKCS #7) in the response. As shown in Appendix C.2, the CSR
contains a challengePassword, which is used for POP linking
(Section 3).
POST [2001:db8::2:321]:61616/est/sen
(Token: 0x45)
(Accept: 281)
(Content-Format: 286)
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]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After verification of the CSR by the server, a 2.04 Changed response
with the issued certificate will be returned to the client.
2.04 Changed
(Token: 0x45)
(Content-Format: 281)
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
3082026e06092a864886f70d010702a082025f3082025b0201013100300b
06092a864886f70d010701a08202413082023d308201e2a0030201020208
7e7661d7b54e4632300a06082a8648ce3d040302305d310b300906035504
0613025553310b300906035504080c02434131143012060355040a0c0b45
78616d706c6520496e6331163014060355040b0c0d636572746966696361
74696f6e3113301106035504030c0a3830322e3141522043413020170d31
39303133313131323931365a180f39393939313233313233353935395a30
5c310b3009060355040613025553310b300906035504080c024341310b30
0906035504070c024c4131143012060355040a0c0b6578616d706c652049
6e63310c300a060355040b0c03496f54310f300d06035504051306577431
3233343059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004
c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50c
ff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b56
38e59fd9a3818a30818730090603551d1304023000301d0603551d0e0416
041496600d8716bf7fd0e752d0ac760777ad665d02a0301f0603551d2304
183016801468d16551f951bfc82a431d0d9f08bc2d205b1160300e060355
1d0f0101ff0404030205a0302a0603551d1104233021a01f06082b060105
05070804a013301106092b06010401b43b0a01040401020304300a06082a
8648ce3d0403020349003046022100c0d81996d2507d693f3c48eaa5ee94
91bda6db214099d98117c63b361374cd86022100a774989f4c321a5cf25d
832a4d336a08ad67df20f1506421188a0ade6d349236a1003100
The request and response is shown in plain text in Appendix C.2.
A.3. serverkeygen
In a serverkeygen exchange, the CoAP POST request looks like the
following:
POST 192.0.2.1:8085/est/skg
(Token: 0xa5)
(Accept: 62)
(Content-Format: 286)
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
3081d03078020100301631143012060355040a0c0b736b67206578616d70
6c653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004c8
b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff
958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638
e59fd9a000300a06082a8648ce3d040302034800304502207c553981b1fe
349249d8a3f50a0346336b7dfaa099cf74e1ec7a37a0a760485902210084
79295398774b2ff8e7e82abb0c17eaef344a5088fa69fd63ee611850c34b
0a
The response would follow [RFC8710] and could look like the
following:
2.04 Changed
(Token: 0xa5)
(Content-Format: 62)
[ The hexadecimal representations below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
84 # array(4)
19 011C # unsigned(284)
58 8A # bytes(138)
308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
6b020101042061336a86ac6e7af4a96f632830ad4e6aa0837679206094d7
679a01ca8c6f0c37a14403420004c8b421f11c25e47e3ac57123bf2d9fdc
494f028bc351cc80c03f150bf50cff958d75419d81a6a245dffae790be95
cf75f602f9152618f816a2b23b5638e59fd9
19 0119 # unsigned(281)
59 01D3 # bytes(467)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The private key in the response above is without CMS EnvelopedData
and has no additional encryption beyond DTLS (Section 4.8).
The request and response is shown in plain text in Appendix C.3.
A.4. csrattrs
The following is a csrattrs exchange:
REQ:
GET example.com:61616/est/att
RES:
2.05 Content
(Content-Format: 285)
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
307c06072b06010101011630220603883701311b131950617273652053455
420617320322e3939392e31206461746106092a864886f70d010907302c06
0388370231250603883703060388370413195061727365205345542061732
0322e3939392e32206461746106092b240303020801010b06096086480165
03040202
A 2.05 Content response should contain attributes that are relevant
for the authenticated client. This example is copied from
Appendix A.2 of [RFC7030], where the base64 representation is
replaced with a hexadecimal representation of the equivalent binary
format. The EST-coaps server returns attributes that the client can
ignore if they are unknown to the client.
Appendix B. EST-coaps Block Message Examples
Two examples are presented in this section:
1. A cacerts exchange shows the use of Block2 and the block headers.
2. An enroll exchange shows the Block1 and Block2 size negotiation
for request and response payloads.
The payloads are shown unencrypted. In practice, the message
contents would be binary formatted and transferred over an encrypted
DTLS tunnel. The corresponding CoAP headers are only shown in
Appendix B.1. Creating CoAP headers is assumed to be generally
known.
B.1. cacerts
This section provides a detailed example of the messages using DTLS
and CoAP Option Block2. The example block length is taken as 64,
which gives an SZX value of 2.
The following is an example of a cacerts exchange over DTLS. The
content length of the cacerts response in Appendix A.1 of [RFC7030]
contains 639 bytes in binary in this example. The CoAP message adds
around 10 bytes in this example, and the DTLS record around 29 bytes.
To avoid IP fragmentation, the CoAP Block Option is used and an MTU
of 127 is assumed to stay within one IEEE 802.15.4 packet. To stay
below the MTU of 127, the payload is split in 9 packets with a
payload of 64 bytes each, followed by a last tenth packet of 63
bytes. The client sends an IPv6 packet containing a UDP datagram
with DTLS record protection that encapsulates a CoAP request 10 times
(one fragment of the request per block). The server returns an IPv6
packet containing a UDP datagram with the DTLS record that
encapsulates the CoAP response. The CoAP request-response exchange
with block option is shown below. Block Option is shown in a
decomposed way (block-option:NUM/M/size) indicating the kind of Block
Option (2 in this case) followed by a colon, and then the block
number (NUM), the more bit (M = 0 in Block2 response means it is last
block), and block size with exponent (2^(SZX+4)) separated by
slashes. The Length 64 is used with SZX=2. The CoAP Request is sent
Confirmable (CON), and the Content-Format of the response, even
though not shown, is 281 (application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-
only). The transfer of the 10 blocks with partially filled block
NUM=9 is shown below.
GET example.com:9085/est/crts (2:0/0/64) -->
<-- (2:0/1/64) 2.05 Content
GET example.com:9085/est/crts (2:1/0/64) -->
<-- (2:1/1/64) 2.05 Content
|
|
|
GET example.com:9085/est/crts (2:9/0/64) -->
<-- (2:9/0/64) 2.05 Content
The header of the GET request looks like the following:
Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
Code = 0x01 (0.1 GET)
Token = 0x9a (client generated)
Options
Option (Uri-Host)
Option Delta = 0x3 (option# 3)
Option Length = 0xB
Option Value = "example.com"
Option (Uri-Port)
Option Delta = 0x4 (option# 3+4=7)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 9085
Option (Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x4 (option# 7+4=11)
Option Length = 0x3
Option Value = "est"
Option (Uri-Path)Uri-Path)
Option Delta = 0x0 (option# 11+0=11)
Option Length = 0x4
Option Value = "crts"
Option (Accept)
Option Delta = 0x6 (option# 11+6=17)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 281
Payload = [Empty]
The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options can be omitted if they coincide
with the transport protocol destination address and port,
respectively. Explicit Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are typically
used when an endpoint hosts multiple virtual servers and uses the
Options to route the requests accordingly.
To provide further details on the CoAP headers, the first two and the
last blocks are written out below. The header of the first Block2
response looks like the following:
Ver = 1
T = 2 (ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied from request by server)
Options
Option
Option Delta = 0xC (option# 12 Content-Format)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 281
Option
Option Delta = 0xB (option# 12+11=23 Block2)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 0x0A (block#=0, M=1, SZX=2)
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
Payload =
3082027b06092a864886f70d010702a082026c308202680201013100300b
06092a864886f70d010701a082024e3082024a308201f0a0030201020209
009189bc
The header of the second Block2 response looks like the following:
Ver = 1
T = 2 (means ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied from request by server)
Options
Option
Option Delta = 0xC (option# 12 Content-Format)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 281
Option
Option Delta = 0xB (option 12+11=23 Block2)
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 0x1A (block#=1, M=1, SZX=2)
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
Payload =
df9c99244b300a06082a8648ce3d0403023067310b300906035504061302
5553310b300906035504080c024341310b300906035504070c024c413114
30120603
The header of the tenth and final Block2 response looks like the
following:
Ver = 1
T = 2 (means ACK)
Code = 0x45 (2.05 Content)
Token = 0x9a (copied from request by server)
Options
Option
Option Delta = 0xC (option# 12 Content-Format)
Option Length = 0x2
Option Value = 281
Option
Option Delta = 0xB (option# 12+11=23 Block2 )
Option Length = 0x1
Option Value = 0x92 (block#=9, M=0, SZX=2)
[ The hexadecimal representation below would NOT be transported
in hex, but in binary. Hex is used because a binary representation
cannot be rendered well in text. ]
Payload =
2ec0b4af52d46f3b7ecc9687ddf267bcec368f7b7f1353272f022047a28a
e5c7306163b3c3834bab3c103f743070594c089aaa0ac870cd13b902caa1
003100
B.2. enroll / reenroll
In this example, the requested Block2 size of 256 bytes, required by
the client, is transferred to the server in the very first request
message. The block size of 256 is equal to (2^(SZX+4)), which gives
SZX=4. The notation for block numbering is the same as in
Appendix B.1. The header fields and the payload are omitted for
brevity.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:0/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 1)} -->
<-- (ACK) (1:0/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:1/1/256)
{CSR (frag# 2)} -->
<-- (ACK) (1:1/1/256) (2.31 Continue)
.
.
.
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(1:N1/0/256)
{CSR(frag# N1+1)}-->
|
...........Immediate response .........
|
<-- (ACK) (1:N1/0/256)(2:0/1/256)(2.04 Changed)
{Cert resp (frag# 1)}
POST [2001:db8::2:1]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:1/0/256) -->
<-- (ACK) (2:1/1/256)(2.04 Changed)
{Cert resp (frag# 2)}
.
.
.
POST [2001:db8::2:321]:61616/est/sen (CON)(2:N2/0/256) -->
<-- (ACK) (2:N2/0/256) (2.04 Changed)
{Cert resp (frag# N2+1)}
Figure 6: EST-coaps Enrollment with Multiple Blocks
N1+1 blocks have been transferred from client to server, and N2+1
blocks have been transferred from server to client.
Appendix C. Message Content Breakdown
This appendix presents the hexadecimal dumps of the binary payloads
in plain text shown in Appendix A.
C.1. cacerts
The cacerts response containing one root CA certificate is presented
in plain text in the following:
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 831953162763987486 (0xb8bb0fe604f6a1e)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=Example Inc,
OU=certification, CN=Root CA
Validity
Not Before: Jan 31 11:27:03 2019 GMT
Not After : Jan 26 11:27:03 2039 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=Example Inc,
OU=certification, CN=Root CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:0c:1b:1e:82:ba:8c:c7:26:80:97:3f:97:ed:b8:
a0:c7:2a:b0:d4:05:f0:5d:4f:e2:9b:99:7a:14:cc:
ce:89:00:83:13:d0:96:66:b6:ce:37:5c:59:5f:cc:
8e:37:f8:e4:35:44:97:01:1b:e9:0e:56:79:4b:d9:
1a:d9:51:ab:45
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
1D:F1:20:89:44:D7:7B:5F:1D:9D:CB:51:EE:24:4A:52:3F:3E:F5:DE
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
1D:F1:20:89:44:D7:7B:5F:1D:9D:CB:51:EE:24:4A:52:3F:3E:F5:DE
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
email:certify@example.com
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:20:2b:89:1d:d4:11:d0:7a:6d:6f:62:19:47:63:5b:
a4:c4:31:65:29:6b:3f:63:37:26:f0:2e:51:ec:f4:64:bd:40:
02:21:00:b4:be:8a:80:d0:86:75:f0:41:fb:c7:19:ac:f3:b3:
9d:ed:c8:5d:c9:2b:30:35:86:8c:b2:da:a8:f0:5d:b1:96
C.2. enroll / reenroll
The enrollment request is presented in plain text in the following:
Certificate Request:
Data:
Version: 0 (0x0)
Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
Attributes:
challengePassword: <256-bit POP linking value>
Requested Extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
othername:<unsupported>
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:21:00:92:56:3a:54:64:63:bd:9e:cf:f1:70:d0:fd:
1f:2e:f0:d3:d0:12:16:0e:5e:e9:0c:ff:ed:ab:ec:9b:9a:38:
92:02:20:17:9f:10:a3:43:61:09:05:1a:ba:d1:75:90:a0:9b:
c8:7c:4d:ce:54:53:a6:fc:11:35:a1:e8:4e:ed:75:43:77
The CSR contains a challengePassword, which is used for POP linking
(Section 3). The CSR also contains an id-on-hardwareModuleName
hardware identifier to customize the returned certificate to the
requesting device (See [RFC7299] and [PKI-GUIDE]).
The issued certificate presented in plain text in the following:
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 9112578475118446130 (0x7e7661d7b54e4632)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc,
OU=certification, CN=802.1AR CA
Validity
Not Before: Jan 31 11:29:16 2019 GMT
Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc,
OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
68:D1:65:51:F9:51:BF:C8:2A:43:1D:0D:9F:08:BC:2D:20:5B:11:60
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
othername:<unsupported>
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:46:02:21:00:c0:d8:19:96:d2:50:7d:69:3f:3c:48:ea:a5:
ee:94:91:bd:a6:db:21:40:99:d9:81:17:c6:3b:36:13:74:cd:
86:02:21:00:a7:74:98:9f:4c:32:1a:5c:f2:5d:83:2a:4d:33:
6a:08:ad:67:df:20:f1:50:64:21:18:8a:0a:de:6d:34:92:36
C.3. serverkeygen
The following is the server-side key generation request presented in
plain text:
Certificate Request:
Data:
Version: 0 (0x0)
Subject: O=skg example
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
Attributes:
a0:00
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:20:7c:55:39:81:b1:fe:34:92:49:d8:a3:f5:0a:03:
46:33:6b:7d:fa:a0:99:cf:74:e1:ec:7a:37:a0:a7:60:48:59:
02:21:00:84:79:29:53:98:77:4b:2f:f8:e7:e8:2a:bb:0c:17:
ea:ef:34:4a:50:88:fa:69:fd:63:ee:61:18:50:c3:4b:0a
The following is the private key content of the server-side key
generation response presented in plain text:
Private-Key: (256 bit)
priv:
61:33:6a:86:ac:6e:7a:f4:a9:6f:63:28:30:ad:4e:
6a:a0:83:76:79:20:60:94:d7:67:9a:01:ca:8c:6f:
0c:37
pub:
04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
The following is the certificate in the server-side key generation
response payload presented in plain text:
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
b3:31:3e:8f:3f:c9:53:8e
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: O=skg example
Validity
Not Before: Sep 4 07:44:03 2019 GMT
Not After : Aug 30 07:44:03 2039 GMT
Subject: O=skg example
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
Public-Key: (256 bit)
pub:
04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
56:38:e5:9f:d9
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA:FALSE
Netscape Comment:
OpenSSL Generated Certificate
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:
96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:45:02:21:00:e9:5b:fa:25:a0:89:76:65:22:46:f2:d9:61:
43:da:39:fc:e0:dc:4c:9b:26:b9:cc:e1:f2:41:64:cc:2b:12:
b6:02:20:13:51:fd:8e:ea:65:76:4e:34:59:d3:24:e4:34:5f:
f5:b2:a9:15:38:c0:49:76:11:17:96:b3:69:8b:f6:37:9c
Acknowledgements
The authors are very grateful to Klaus Hartke for his detailed
explanations on the use of Block with DTLS and his support for the
Content-Format specification. The authors would like to thank Esko
Dijk and Michael Verschoor for the valuable discussions that helped
in shaping the solution. They would also like to thank Peter
Panburana for his feedback on technical details of the solution.
Constructive comments were received from Benjamin Kaduk, Eliot Lear,
Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, Julien Vermillard, John Manuel, Oliver
Pfaff, Pete Beal, and Carsten Bormann.
Interop tests were done by Oliver Pfaff, Thomas Werner, Oskar
Camezind, Bjorn Elmers, and Joel Hoglund.
Robert Moskowitz provided code to create the examples.
Contributors
Martin Furuhed contributed to the EST-coaps specification by
providing feedback based on the Nexus EST-over-CoAPS server
implementation that started in 2015. Sandeep Kumar kick-started this
specification and was instrumental in drawing attention to the
importance of the subject.
Authors' Addresses
Peter van der Stok
Consultant
Email: stokcons@bbhmail.nl
Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Michael C. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: https://www.sandelman.ca/
Shahid Raza
RISE Research Institutes of Sweden
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-16440 Kista, Stockholm
Sweden
Email: shahid.raza@ri.se
ERRATA
