ASPA Verification in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships

defines a method for verifying the origin of BGP prefixes, which can resolve the most common source AS hijacking. Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) is a methodology to validate the entire AS path. ASPA verification procedures use a shared signed database of customer-to-provider relationships using a new RPKI object - Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA). This method relies heavily on the accuracy of the shared signed database of customer-to-provider relationships. Currently, two ASes may have different relationships at different interconnection points. For example:

Case 1) AS1 is AS2's customer in Europe, but AS1 and AS2 establish P2P relationships in Asia;

Case 2) AS3 is AS4's customer in Europe, on the contrary, AS4 is AS3's customer in Asia; There are some other examples, not fully listed in this draft. For case 1, AS1 signs one record ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...]) per .

\ / ----> \ Peer Peer/ +---------------+ Asia ----> Figure 3: Problematic Use Case ]]> As shown in Figure 3, the main processing steps per are as follows: 1) Check Point receives the Route P1, AS-Path: AS2 (via Asia Link) AS1 ... AS11; 2) Check Point uses ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...]) to validate AS-Pair (AS1 AS2) Per the AS_PATH verification procedure defined in , it will return the result "Valid". Actually here should return the result "Invalid", not the result "Valid", because the AS-Relationship between AS1 and AS2 in Asia is P2P, not C2P. This problem arises because of the existence of regionalized AS-Relationships. This document proposes a method for ASPA verification in the Presence of Regionalized AS-Relationships.

ASPA: Autonomous System Provider Authorization C2P: Customer to Provider OV: Origin Validation P2C: Provider to Customer P2P: Peer to Peer RP: Relying Party RPKI: Resource Public Key Infrastructure

This section discusses how to obtain regionalized AS-Relationships on routers. Option 1: Add a Region ID field to ASPA Object Each organization holds an AS number reports its C2P business relationship information to the RIR where it is located. The key information reported: the customer's AS number, the customer's provider AS number list (one or more), the region identifier, the region identifier is newly added by the present draft, and identifies the customer's business relationship with the one or more of its Providers in the same region is C2P. Each RIR maintains C2P business relationship information like maintaining ROA related information, when the region identifier is empty, it indicates that the business relationship between the Customer and the one or more of its Providers in all regions is C2P. RP (Relying Party) obtains all the C2P business relationship information from each RIR, and generates the ASPA Validation Database entries. RFC8210 RPKI-Router Protocol extension supports the ability to carry region identifier when delivering the ASPA Validation Database to routers, and delivers the enhanced ASPA Validation Database from RP to routers. Option 2: Local Management of the enhanced C2P business relationships Locally, by analyzing the global Internet routing table and various Internet public data, a regionalized C2P business relational database is sorted out. Option 3: TBD By processing as above, AS1 signs one record ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...], Europe).

Once we get the Regionalized AS-Relationships, the main processing steps in section 1 (Figure 3) will be changed as follows: 1) Check Point receives the Route P1, AS-Path: AS2 (via Asia Link) AS1 ... AS11; 2) Check Point uses ASPA (AS1, AFI, [AS2, ...], Europe) to validate AS-Pair (AS1 AS2) Per the AS_PATH verification procedure , because the ASPA record contains region identifier information, further confirm which region the [AS1 AS2] connection is in (we can use various tools such as TraceRoute etc. This needs to be described in detail in next revision.), if we get the region identifier information of the latter is different from the ASPA records (In current case, what we get is Asia, not Europe), then the ASPA verification will return the result "Invalid". From the above processing results, we can see that the solution proposed in this draft has worked and solved the problem described in the second section.

No IANA actions are required for this document.

This document does not change the security properties of RPKI and ASPA.

The following people made significant contributions to this document:

TBD.